"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٣‎٤] (٤٢٤/٧٣)

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^ if, on account of navigation difficulties, there is no probability of the
enemy being caught up and smashed, there is no object in the
pursuit being continued." This telegram was repeated to General
Nixon. Finally, on October 6th, Sir John was ordered to stop his
advance.
Meanwhile, a reply had been sent from Mesopotamia on the subject
of the " navigation difficulties." It was to the effect that by marching
troops with land transport and by lightening the vessels, the difficulties,
of navigation had been overcome.
This telegram, it appears, was the cause of a great deal of misunder
standing at Home. The Home authorities were, apparently, unaware
of all General Nixon's requests for more river transport, and considered
that this reply made it clear that sufficient transport was available in
Mesopotamia. Consequently, in the subsequent discussions at Home on
the subject of the advance to Baghdad, the question of river transport
was not considered at all.
The situation in the Near East, the likelihood of Germany getting
direct communication to Constantinople, the precarious situation in
Gallipoli, now drew the attention of the Cabinet to Baghdad. The
capture of this city seemed very desirable on political grounds, as a set-off
to our failure in the Near East. A telegram, on the 8th October, was
accordingly sent to the Viceroy, stating that every effort would be made
to supply the forces necessary for the occupation of Baghdad, but that
it was not desired to make the attempt with insufficient forces. It may
not be generally known that about this time the question of asking for
the assistance of Japanese troops in Mesopotamia was considered by the
Secretary of State and the Viceroy. It was suggested that 2 divisions
should be asked for.
As a result of the Cabinet falling a victim to the lure of Baghdad,,
the question of the advisability or otherwise of the occupation of the city
was considered by the General Staff at Home and by the Military advisers
to the India Office.
The question seems to have been considered entirely from the point
of view of sufficient fighting troops : the question of transport and main
tenance was not considered, presumably in view of the misunderstanding
in connection with the "navigation difficulties" telegram. Expert
military opinion at Home concluded that General Nixon's force was
sufficient to take Baghdad in the first instance : but that the retention of
the city with existing forces was an unjustifiable risk. To hold Baghdad
it was considered that 2 extra divisions must be sent.
An inter-departmental Committee was appointed by the Cabinet to
answer certain definite questions. This committee, composed of re-
presentatives of the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty and India
Office, came to the conclusion that, on both military and political grounds^.