"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٤‎٩] (٤٢٤/١٠٣)

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shade, and shade was scanty even in the palm groves. It was non
existent in the plains of Es Sinn.
Yet till the crisis of Ctesiphon, the medical arrangements worked
fairly satisfactorily. The medical authorities could point out the com
paratively low sick rate in 1915. It was not till 1916 that the real har
vest of disease was reaped. This state of affairs can be accounted for
by five reasons :
(1) Iwiprovisation. In this India excels. When either through fear
of asking or through refusals of their requests, the medical authorities
did not get what they required, fresh organizations were improvised.
At a stroke of the pen hospital accommodation was increased from
200 to 600 beds. Field ambulances retained their casualties instead
of evacuating them directly. River steamers were used as hospital-
ships. After Ctesiphon the " Mosul " was thus used though it had no
hospital fittings and only one medical officer.
(2) Owing to lack of shipping, not all the troops could be employed
at once. Thus a portion of the force could" always be at rest in the
severe climatic conditions of the country.
(3) The efficiency with which measures against epidemic diseases
were carried out. The Mesopotamian Commission Report gives un
stinted praise to the medical authorities for their efforts to combat
malaria, scurvy, etc.
(4) The great efforts of the medical executive officers who never
spared themselves.
(5) Regular troops and good discipline which resulted in good sani
tary arrangements.
What were the reasons for the breakdown of the transport, supply
and medical services in this campaign ? Firstly the root of the evil
lay in our failure to square political ends with our military means. At
the beginning we had no clear vision of Baghdad, but followed a patch
work policy, which grew ever more ambitious. The force from the
first was ill-found to meet the privations and hardships inseparable from
campaigning in Mesopotamia. As General Gorringe said—
" It was believed to be a side show and no man's child."
In the Nile campaign, Gordon's death in Khartum gave our Govern
ment a definite objective. Transport, material, troops, were collected
in that order and a methodical preparation finally resulted in Omdur-
man. The fall of Kut, again, gave us a definite object. The history
of the British Empire affords many examples of our policy outrunning
our military means. In the Zulu war, for instance, Secocoeni retired
to his caves and we had not the guns nor the regular forces to drive
him out. The Secretary of State wrote—
" Can Secocoeni be only driven out of his caves by starvation ?
Would nou rockets do it or some such appliance ? I suggest cayenne