"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎٥‎٣] (٤٢٤/١١٠)

85
By Marcli the medical arrangements had improved though the A.T.,
cart was still the only available vehicle to carry the wounded. Apart
from this method of torturing the wounded the evacuation of casualties
from Dujaila to Wadi worked smoothly. By April medical organi
zation was as near normal as the hardships of the campaign and the
lack of appliances would allow.
In view of all these facts, it is not surprising to find that frequent
allusions are made to the morale of the troops. It was reported that
the number of self-inflicted wounds among the Indian troops was alarm
ing. Very few convictions as a result of courts martial are recorded
and it appears that a good deal of unjust suspicion was roused. The
3rd and 7th divisions had gone through the severe fighting of France
and were full of recruits and reserve officers. In many cases drafts
arrived from their depots almost totally untrained. Faith was pinned
on the 13th British Division which was to come from Egypt. But this
formation had gone through Gallipoli and was full of partially trained
men. It was new to the country, the administrative difficulties and
climatic conditions, and it did not come up to expectation.
One more fact perhaps had its effect on morale. The campaign had
now been in progress some 18 months. One small list of honours had
been published, but not a single despatch had appeared in the press.
In February Headquarters wired to A.H.Q., India, that a long list of
French and Belgian decorations had just been published and that Force
44 D " seemed to be neglected. Yet the campaign in Mesopotamia had
been the one bright spot in the British effort of the war till this time.
The advance to Baghdad had been sanctioned by the Cabinet to
neutralise the lack of success in other theatres.
On the eve of his advance Lieut.-General F. J. Aylmer, v.c., k.c.b.,
had wired to Force Headquarters.
u After consulting Major-Generals G. J. Younghusband, k.c.m.g.,
k.c.i.e., c.b ., and G. V. Kemball, c.b., d.s.o ., I determined to continue
the advance on Kut, but it is my distinct duty to point out that it is
a most hazardous undertaking, for which I, of course, accept full
responsibility, as I consider the situation demands a supreme effort
to relieve Townshend My medical establishments, as you may
calculate, are deplorably low and wounded cannot receive proper
attention. Even if it is necessary to remove fighting men from the ships,
more must be sent up at once. I have only one aeroplane in action.... 99
Force cc D " Headquarters replied :
I must leave the matter to your decision. Am confident that you
and the fine troops under your command will achieve your object. J>
It is instructive to see how the Turkish administrative arrangements
fared. The enemy had five large river steamers of the Medjidieh class
besides mahailas. But they had the great advantage of the stream and