"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎٦‎٨] (٤٢٤/١٤٠)

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drawn up. Meanwhile he was to defer the delivery of the attack! An?
hour later Kemball reported that to make a night attack would be
preferable, as the troops were in need both of food and rest. Although
in an aerial reconnaissance which had been made at about 1600 a.
distinct movement up stream of Turkish troops had been observed,
the total strength of the enemy's forces was still estimated as being
9,500 op the left and 5,500 on the right bank of the Tigris. Aylmer
therefore decided to adopt the alternative of a night attack, and :
instructions were seut both to Younghusband and Kemball accordingly.
At dusk the Artillery on the left bank again withdrew to their bivouacs
near the bridge. At 1800 orders were sent to General Younghusband
that the 35th Infantry Brigade was to become a reserve and to be placed
near the bridge on the left bank of the river ; the 19th and 21st Infantry
Brigades were to reorganise, entrench and take over the whole front line-
on the left bank, the 21st being on the outer flank ; the 128th Pioneers
were to join the main body of the 9th Infantry Brigade, which, as has
been stated, was now holding a position some 2 or 3 miles to the north
of the Tigris, and were to assist these units to entrench it.
While the evacuation of wounded and the despatch of water and 1
rations to the troops were in hand, the Seaforths and 125th of the 19th
Brigade fell back at 2000 for about 1,000 yards and entrenched,
and the 41st and the 9th Bhopals, of the 21st Brigade, then relieved the-
whole of the units of the 19th Brigade. Owing to the proximity of the
enemy it was 1300 before the latter Brigade, which was to replace the
35th Brigade, had been concentrated. The night was now very dark
and cold, there was a strong wind and rain began to fall. As a result the
guides lost their way, the men became exhausted with marching and
countermarching through clinging mud ; the relief of the 35th Brigade
did not take place during the night, and in the end it was not moved to
the bridge until after daybreak on the 9th.
The reports of patrols sent out in the early morning of the 9th when,
the rain had turned into a drizzle, were to the effect that the Turks were
still in position. The mud now rendered all movement slow, the drizzling
rain caused observation to be more difficult than ever, but at 1000
the 16th Cavalry reported, from a position 3 miles to the north of
Shaikh Saad, that there were no Turks to be seen, and that many of the
trenches were certainly unoccupied.
Meanwhile the Cavalry Brigade, which had moved out at 0730
as escort to a couple of staff officers who were to reconnoitre the ground
to be passed over during the night attack, found that the Turkish trenches
on the right bank were empty. A few wounded men were seen limping
painfully away from Shaikh Saad, and, on the left bank, many cavalry
were observed to be marching westwards. , Feeling their way cautiously
forwards the Cavalry Brigade gained a position at noon about 3 miles