"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎٩‎٠] (٤٢٤/١٨٤)

153
guished, an intense and final bombardment of tlie enemy's first line
would be made for two minutes from both banks of the Tigris The
artillery would then lift on to the second line, on which an intense fire
would be directed for a further period of ten minutes. If the leading
troops of the British were more than from 150 to 200 yards from the
Turkish trenches at the commencement of the intense fire they must
advance to this distance under cover of the bombardment, and the
assault must be delivered as soon as the fire of the guns had been litted
on to the second line. The principal attack was to be made from the
frontage held by the 35th Brigade, which was to be supported by the
9th Brigade, and it was of special importance to capture the bastion
situated about 500 yards from the Tigris, and also a small work near the
bank of the river and in front of the general line of entrenchments. The
general reserve would consist of the 28th Brigade, and this would be
placed by 0600 one mile in rear of the five inch howitzers of the 72nd
and 77th Batteries, which were behind the British right centre. The
Cavalry Brigade was by daybreak to have moved to a position on the
extreme right of the army. The troops on the right bank were to assist
those on the left by bringing enfilade fire to bear on the Turkish posi
tions ; but the two squadrons of the 33rd Cavalry and the two Horse
Artillery guns were to advance to the bank of the Tigris and harass the
enemy's retirement to the greatest possible extent. The transport was
to be ready to march at the shortest notice, and in general all prepara
tions were to be made for vigorous pursuit. The headquarters of the
Corps would be in the river steamer Medjidieh.
There is little comment to be made in regard to the form of these
orders, except that they transgress in some respects the salutary regula
tion that an operation order should tell the executive commander 4 * no
thing that he can or should arrange for himself.... " If General Young-
husband were competent to conduct the attack, he should surely have
been competent to allot to the troops entrusted to him the tasks cal
culated in his opinion to further the success of the general plan of driv
ing in the enemy's right. As it was he was relieved by Aylmer of thi^
duty, and therefore, so far as the allotment of troops would affect the
success or failure of the attack, was also relieved of a measure of the
responsibility which should have fallen to him.
The prolonged telegraphic correspondence between the front and
General Headquarters, a disagreeable phenomenon of modern war
which seems to have been produced by improved means of communica
tion, showed little slackening even on the eve of battle ; for General
Aylmer felt constrained to point out to the Commander-in-Chief and to
General Townshend that he was far from possessing full liberty of action
as between the two banks of the Tigris. A large portion of the bridging
material had been destroyed by bad weather, much of what remained
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