"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٢] (٤٢٤/٢٤٩)

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5,200 rifles and 21 guns ; in the Sinn Dujaila position about H,000 rifles
(including the 2nd and 35th Divisions). 35 guns and a cavalry brigade.
The above figures may be on the high side.
The British had available about 24.000 rifles and 135 guns. It must
be remembered however that many of the units included in this force were
composite, made up of drafts for Kut battalions, or else amalgamations
of units which had lost heavily. The wastage of experienced officers had
been enormous. Troops were exhausted and not well fed. There was
a shortage of all comforts and of a good many necessaries. A large pro
portion of the troops had to be kept on guard duties owing to Arab activi
ty. The actual dispositions were:—On the left bank 7th Division, about
6,800 rifles ; on the right bank 3rd Division, about 9,000, and the 37th
and 36th Brigades, mustering together less than 4,000, behind them. The
13th Division was at this time about 6,600 strong. En route, marching
up the riveT, were a further 5,500 men and 32 guns not yet available.
On the evening of the 11th an exceptionally heavy thunderstorm
necessitated the postponement of the advance till the afternoon of the
12th, when about 1,000 yards was made by local fighting of an unco
ordinated nature which cost us 450 casualties. Another gale to the north
east now broke' the causeway behind the 3rd Division and flooded the
country from the river to the Umm-al-Baram. All guns were held
up and it was impossible to get artillery into positions from which they
could support the attack. There were also constant alarms on the left
front of Turk and Arab movements, which led to much unnecessary
movement of troops.
The difficulty of locating the enemy, always extreme in this country,
was increased by the knee-deep water between our positions. The Turks,
moreover, had skilfully established advanced picquets in the banked up
water cuts which, as they held possession of the bunds at their mouths,
they were able to keep dry or flood at will. This procedure was unusual
tor the Turks, who did not usually favour advanced posts in front of their
main defences.
In spite of the difficulty of reconnaissance it was ascertained that
there was an advanced enemy work running north and south about 8C0
„ ^ yards south east of the front line of their main
Preliminary Operation, V> •, t • x- mi • • t • -i -i ,
15-4-1916. -^ ar k J- 83, position. This it was decided to seize as
a preliminary measure, partly to give a jumping
off place for the main attack, but more particularly to secure some observa
tion for our own artillery. The attack was made before dawn on the 15th
in a heavy thunderstorm, by the 7th and 9th Brigades abreast, each
on a frontage of 400 yards. The weather conditions and the state of
the ground were most unfavourable, and the compasses were said to
have been affected by the heavy lightning, so that a portion of the troops
actually moved in a complete circle, and found itself, at daylight