"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٠] (٤٢٤/٢٦٤)

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11. After deploying, the Brigades advanced to. within a 1,000 yards
of the enemy, when a heavy rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire was
opened on them at 0535. The light was not sufficiently good to enable
the enemy's position to be clearly seen and the advance managed to
continue for a few minutes longer, by which time the leading troops had
got to within 700 yards of the position. From this point, any further
advance was impossible by day, as the ground was .quite flat and devoid
of any cover. The lines dug themselves in where, they were, the rem^
nants of the two leading lines falling back by degrees to the third line,
which was about 1,000 yards from the enemy's. position. The 21st
Brigade was in reserve, about 2,500 yards from the enemy's position.
It was my intention to renew the attack under the cover of darkness,
when an advance over open ground presented a better prospect of
success. ;
By 0730 my position had improved, and the trenches gave suffi
cient cover to enable the troops to reply to the enemy's fire, and the latter
lessened appreciably.
12. At about 0915, the Corps Commander visited my H. Q. v
and ordered me to renew the attack that night, placing another Brigade
at my disposal. I decided to attack between the marsh and the com
munication trench, on a two Brigade front, each Brigade having a front
age of attack of 200 yards. The two other Brigades were to be in sup
port, a detachment being sent to make a feint attack by fire on the
enemy's position south of the communication trench. I intended to
carry out my attack at 0300.
13. There had been a wind blowing all morning from the north-west,
and this wind strengthening, the marsh began to advance towards our
trenches. At 1215, the 28th Brigade who were on the right and
nearest the marsh, reported the water to be rising rapidly and at 1300
the most advanced troops had to fall back ; the water having entered
their trenches. Attempts had been made to make a bund to keep out
the water, but near the front trenches the enemy'§ fire interfered with
this work.
14. At 1440, orders were received from the Corps that the pro
posed attack was postponed for 24 hours, owing to the rise of the marsh,
15. A line of defence for the night 6th-7th April was selected. The
28th Brigade was ordered to hold the trenches from the marsh to 150
yards south of the communication trench, the 19th Brigade held the
ground from the left of the 28th Brigade to the River, and the 21st Brigade
was kept in reserve about 900 yards in rear of the centre.
16. On the 7th April, I went to see the Corps Commander at 0700
and received instructions to advance against the whole of the enem /^s
front, with a view T to getting as far forward as possible, digging in and
consolidating a new line as close as possible to the enemy's position.
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