"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٨] (٤٢٤/٣٢١)

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It seems clear that H. M. Government were opposed to any further
commitments in Mesopotamia and wished to adhere to the original object
of the campuign, viz., the protection of the Persian Oil Fields.
General Maude objected to a withdrawal, or a defensive attitude,
and advised, as the best defence, an advance against the enemy.
In a letter to the C.-in-C. India, dated October 23rd, 1916, General
Skeen made the following remarks on Maude's proposed plan.
44 He (Maude) thinks he could threaten the Turkish communications
on the right bank nf the Tigris and perhaps compel them to withdraw
by establishing himself on the Hai without incurring heavy losses. His
view is that by this plan without frontal attacks he would manoeuvre
them out of their position."
Two months later General Maude's object is much more comprehen
sive.
It is stated in 0 0. No. 10 of 21st February—To surround and
destroy the enemy by moving 3rd Corps across their rear."
In his despat hes, written after the capture of Baghdad, General
Maude gives as his intentions the following :—
" to compel him (the Turk) to give up the Sannaiyat position or to
extend his forces ; and lastly to cross the Tigris as far to the
west as possible and sever his communication."
In none of the correspondence or documents available for examination
in India has any mention been found, at this period, of an intention to
cross the Tigris with the object of cutting off the Turkish forces and
completely destroying them.
One further point may be brought forward in support of the view
that his object at fm t was to manoeuvre the enemy out of his positions
about Kut with the minimum of fighting and loss, and that the conception
of destroying the Turkish Army was a later development.
This is the question of casualties.
He had received definite instructions from the C. I. G. S. that he was
nol to incur heavy casualties : and to this he repeatedly refers when
communicating to the C. I. G. S. the course of the operations. This
fact, added to the defensive tenour of his instructions from the British
Government, to his not being able to rely on further reinforcements and
to the possibility of the 13th Division being withdrawn must have
weighed with him and may have caused a cautious and deliberate opera
tion rather than a bold advance, which would contain an element of risk
but aim at big results.
The question of Maude's object at the outset has been dealt with at
some length because it seems fundamental and must be borne in mind
when considering the opening phases of the offensive.