"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎١] (٤٢٤/٣٦٧)

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This was an excellent 0. P. with about 35' command giving a view
of the country for miles round.
When they saw our encircling move the 51 st Division (7th and 9th
Regiments) were ordered up on the right of the 52nd Division to protect
the gap between Tel Ataf and Umm-at-Tabul.
They saw that the 35th Brigs de was hung up on the river flank.
Then the dust storm began to obscure movements. For a long time
they saw our Cavalry Division slowly moving north-east from Tel Ramal
so slowly thai they were uncertain whether it was cavalry or infantry.
As the column worked further north threatening the railway and
Kazimain it become evident to our Turks that there was danger of their
retreat being cut off. A German Staff Officer was in favour of the 51st
Division making a counter-attack against this flank. Khalil agreed
but the Corps Commander pointed out the futility of such a course with
the numbers in hand. Eventually it was agreed that only if the column
turned out to be cavalry should a counter-attack be launched.
It was then about 1500. The dust storm was at its height and
communication with the left flank was difficult. Khalil heard that we
were gradually working round the left of the 14th Division in the Tel
Mahomed position. The bridges over the Tigris were broken by the
•storm and it was impossible to reinforce that flank even had he had the
troops to do so.
The position was hopeless. At first Khalil was in favour of stopping
where he was and fighting it out. Kiazim Karabekir pointed out that if
he did so the 14th Division and the 2 divisions on the right bank would
be driven back into Baghdad and surrounded ; if not that night, at all
•events next morning. Under the circumstances he advocated retreat.
Khali! finally ma de up his mind to adopt this course and at 2000 issued
orders for tlie retreat.
Everything was in great confusion made worse by the storm.
Still it is most remarkable how well the Turks with all their handi
caps and in face of our greatly superior numbers, especially of cavalry,
•succeeded in this most difficult night withdrawal from close contact with
our troops,
All the stores that could be destroyed were burnt including 7 new
aeroplanes just arrived.
The retreating Turk Divisions got on the move about 2300 but were
forced to halt for 3 hours while the Supply Train moved on. Eventually
at 0200 on 11th March they started again for their destination, 19 miles
north of Baghdad.
At 2315 patrols from the 35th Brigade found the Turkish trenches
on their front empty and started pushing on along the river. The 19th
Brigade were so exhausted after their long day without water that the