"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎١] (٤٢٤/٣٨٧)

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CHAPTER XXV.
Some general reflections on the Campaign.
Throughout this story of. the Campaign, criticisms have been offered
and suggestions made. These criticisms may or may not be sound,
but were made for instructional purposes, based on the facts as known
at the time.
Some general notes are added in conclusion.
Two of the most important factors were undoubtedly Administra
tion and the effect of the terrain. The former has been gone into in
-considerable detail, and it is therefore unnecessary to touch on it again.
The ground enormously favoured the defence. The attacker mov
ing over the open was subject to the full force of the smail arms fire
of the defence at long ranges. The effect pro-
Terrain. duced was so great that again and again such
attacks were brought to a halt with heavy casualties, at ranges between
1,000 and 1,500 yards. The presence of numerous water cuts close to
the river, the lack of all land marks, mirage, and the ease with which
digging could be carried out, all assisted the defence. The vast dis
tances, the flat bare featureless plain, the lack of adequate cover, the
inundations under the control of the enemy up stream of us, all added
enormously to the difficulties of the attack. Movement was handicapped
by lack of information and maps and by the complete absence oi drink
able water, apart from the river, in the hot weather ; while in the cold
weather the whole plain became a morass of sticky mud. In this con
nection, even from a map, the importance of the Tigris is obvious.
But until one has visited the ground it is almost
Importance of Tigris. im p 0SS ^ e f u ny to realise its influence on the opera
tions, not only as an obstacle but as a line of sapply and, above all,
as the source of water to which, therefore, all troops were tied. Ihe
result ol this wae.the one weakness of the defence-, viz,, that except
under the unique conditions afforded by the Suwaikiya Marsh, and
later by the angles between the Hai and Tigris, there was always an
open flank. General Townshend had grasped
The Open Flank. f ac ^ an( j operations at Es Sinn and Ctesi-
phon are good examples of bold night operations. Later in the cam
paign advantage was repeatedly taken of this fact. In deed it may be
said that almost all later battles, Kamadi, Khan Baghdadi, Tikrit,
were planned on the turning of the outer flank.
From a tactical point of view, one of the peculiar lessons seems to
be the advantages of night operations in this country. The difficulties