"الملف 35/134 III (A 54) صور: أمراء جعلان". [و‎‎٦‎٩] (٤٢٦/١٥٣)

rest of the^tribe. The line to take would be for the
Council to recognise the headman of Aiqa as a Sheikh, offer
him a monthly subsidy and allow him some other financial
advantages in the shape of free registration of his dhows
etc* The Council would be the body to say whether such a
policy is practicable, and I propose suggesting this to
them ( to Said Saiyid privately in the first instance ) at
an early opportunity*
Kr♦Hedgcock 1 s Report *
10* i enclose Mr.Hedgcock 1 s report on Sur Customs,
the crux of the Sur problem, houghly speaking Mr.Hedgeocx*s
main arguments run as follows
1. The Muscat State is nearly bankrupt,
S* -i-ts financial re-establishment depends on the enforcement
of Customs dues.
3.Sur - after Muscat and Matrah - is the richest Customs
port in 0;nan, but it ia not under effective Customs
control of the khscat State.
4. To enforce this control, and all that this control implies^
two customs posts must be built at Sur, one in Muqrumtain
and in Aiqa. The one in Aiqa to be garrisoned by 25 men
of the Muscat Levy.
5. If effective Customs control is not established shortly
at Sur, such control as exists will in all probability
become less and less. This will in its turn react
unfavourably on the other Omani ports i.e. by diverting
trade to the practically M free port” of Sur, and by
encouraging other ports to resist Customs control. The
inevitable result will be that the financial re-establish-
ment of the State will be rendered very difficult, if
not impossible, and its disintegration will be brought
a long step nearer.
11
Speaking generally I agree with the above views.