مراسلات متنوعة، تقارير، خرائط وغيرها من الأوراق المتعلقة بالشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٦‎٠] (٢٢٠/١٢٠)

insist here on the Agreement being carried out, then the
Agreement must be taken as the basis everywhere, and on
this basis it is inadmissable that the French should ac
quire the whole of the former Russian sphere in Asiatic
Turkey and much more besides, while Great Britain acquires
nothing. On this basis, then, either the Russian sphere
must be partitioned between the two Powers, or it must
be assigned to some third Power, to preserve a balance.
8. Obviously, however, the last two suggestions are
a reductio ad absurdum, for the partition of Armenia on
such a basis is out of the question at this stage of the
war, would never be consented to by the American Government,
and would raise a storm of indignation among all the
Allied and Associatted Nations, against which no
Government could stand.
9. But if this is so in the case of Armenia, it will
lesser
also be so,in a hardly i&ss degree, in the case of the
Arab countries. The French are well aware that in Syria,
with the poBsible exception of the Lebanon, opinion is
deeply averse from the idea of French assistance, and that
the Joint Declaration has been received with enthusiasm
as implying that the French Government 4o not intend to
force it upon an unwilling people.
10. In Syria there is a de facto Arab Aministration,
recognised by the Allies and unquestionably competent to
express the feelings of the population. On the evidence
that has reached us from the spot, do the French seriously
believe that the Syrians, through their national represen
tatives, will declare for France?
11. It is already clear that they will refuse French