"ملخص تاريخي للأحداث في أراضي الإمبراطورية العثمانية، فارس وشبه الجزيرة العربية التي تؤثر على الموقف البريطاني في الخليج الفارسي، ١٩٠٧-١٩٢٨" [ظ‎‎١‎٠] (١٨٨/٢٧)

18
16th March the Tsar abdicated; three days later the Grand Duke Nicholas,
Commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, was decoyed away from his command, arrested,
and sent to exile in the Crimea. And on the 9th April the Russian Government
issued its proclamation calling for the self-determination of peoples and a durable
peace. Alter the removal of the Grand Duke, divided control, paralysis, and
disintegration attended the Hussian army in the Caucasus, which soon ceased to be
of any active danger to the Turks. Nor were signs wanting that before long Kussian
domination would be challenged by the Caucasian peoples themselves. Pan-Turkish
eastern ambitions, which had seemed unrealisable after the Russian capture of
Erzerum, were now provided with a new, unexpected and increasing opportunity
for their execution.
From the end of May 1917, therefore, Turkey w'as opposed by British armies
alone—on the Mesopotamian front and the Palestine front. Egypt as a goal of
Turkish military effort had been abandoned after the failure at Romani in August
1916; and since the end of 1916 the British had established themselves in Southern
Palestine. Following British defeats at Gaza in March and April 1917, General
Sir E. Allenby had been appointed Commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Force
in June; and with this change the Palestine front, where British preparations for
a great offensive were beino; made, became for Turkey a front of the most dang-erous
possibilities.
In deciding Turkish military policy in the summer of 1917, Enver Pasha
developed a passion for the recovery of Bagdad. It was a project in which his own
and pan-Turkish ambitions in Western Persia, and the German hope of preserving
the cherished scheme of access to the Persian Gulf, all pulled strongly in the same
direction. Notwithstanding opposition from those w T ho saw a storm about to break
in Palestine, and others who wished more attention to be given to Transcaucasia,
Enver Pasha decided on an offensive against Bagdad. The Palestine front was
strong enough for defence; the Russians in Caucasia could be left for the time being
to the demoralising influences at work upon them. To the prejudice of other fronts
preparations were begun for the assembling of the Yilderim army group, to be
launched against Bagdad, and General von Falkenhayn was lent by Germany to
conduct the campaign.
When von Falkenhayn had examined the situation more closely he, too, found
the threat from Palestine alarming. He agreed that the Bagdad offensive could not
be undertaken till the British had been driven back to the Suez Canal. He professed
to see how this could be done. At the beginning of September Enver Pasha was
converted to von Falkenhayn's view; decided on an offensive in Palestine before
attempting the recovery of Bagdad; and appointed the German to the command.
But von Falkenhayn was given no opportunity for executing his plans. The
British advance began at the end of October, and on the 11th December General
Allenby entered Jerusalem. During the summer and autumn of 1917 the British
army in Mesopotamia, likewise, advanced northward and westward of Bagdad and
established itself more firmly in the country than ever.
The rapid conquest of Southern Palestine up to Jerusalem entirely destroyed
Turco-German plans for ambitious offensives, either in Palestine or Mesopotamia;
it also went far towards destroying those German and pan-Turkish hopes which
centred in Bagdad. Henceforward, Turkish armies on these fronts, instead of
regaining territory, could hope to do no more than maintain a harassed defensive
on dwindling resources. Germany began to make plans for obtaining an alternative
route to the East by the Black Sea, Transcaucasia and the Caspian, this possibility
having now appeared in consequence of events in Russia.
On the 8th November, 1917, the Bolshevik cowp d'Etat at Petrograd had placed
Lenin and Trotsky in power. Hostilities between Russia and the Central Powers
were suspended on the 2nd December. The Armistice of Brest-Litovsk was signed
on the 15th and negotiations for peace were begun. The Bolshevik formula for
peace— a No indemnities, no annexations, and the free determination of peoples "—
again appeared during these negotiations. The peace negotiations, above all the
principles on which the Bolshevik Government proclaimed they were conducting
them, gave the signal for the collapse of the Russian front on Turkish territory.
Directed by their committees, the men abandoned their positions and withdrew to
the pre-war Turco-Russian frontier. A few weeks later the Russian army of the
Caucasus melted away as a disorderly armed rabble struggling for every opportunity
to entrain for home.
The abandonment of the Russian front on Turkish soil occurred soon after
the British capture of Jerusalem and occupation of Southern Palestine had as good