"ملخص ثورة الحجاز" [‎٩] (٣٢/١١)

9
telegraph line near Dar el Hamra on the 3rd July , and another important sector of
line and two five-arched bridges near this place were destroyed on the 5th. On the
10th the Aiabs surprised a detachment of 50 Turkish cavalry and infantry under Abdel
Hamid Bey el Masri (late 4th Army representative with Ibn Rashid) who were en route
from Medina to Hail to join Ibn Rashid {see paragraph '24). The whole party were killed
^ or captured, Abdel Hamid el Masri being among the former. On the 17th, Fakhri Pasha
represented the situation of his forces as serious and critical; he complained bitterly of thr
way in which they had been neglected. He thought that Medina might be able to hold
out till the beginning of September, when the new date harvest, which promised well
(2,000,000 kilos), was due, but doubted if the 2nd Composite force at Tebuk would be able
to hold out so long. On the 31st, Sherif Ali made a successful raid against one of his
posts south-west of Medina, killing about 50 Turks.
28. On the 1st August it was reported that Arab activity against the railway
north of Maan continued and arrangements were being made for an extension
northwards of operations in the autumn. With this object in view, two companies qf
Imperial Camel Corps were en route to Akaba. On the 5th August the enemy's
concentration at Kutrani was still proceeding. A small Turkish column with machine
guns and a convoy of 50 animals had succeeded in reaching Maan towards the end of
July. Repairs to the damaged line between Juruf ed Derwish and Jerdun continued.
A proposal by the Commander at Jerdun to make an attack from that place against
Tatilah with the object of collecting the considerable quantities of grain in this area
and ejecting the Arabs was discountenanced by the Officer Commanding Ilnd Army
Corps, who condemned anv offensive at present far from the railway as premature, and
considered it more important to clear the Arabs away from the line in the section Maan
to Aneiza. No attempt had as yet been made to repair the railway south of Matm
(see note to paragraph 16). An aerodrome had been established by the Turks at Tebuk
with the object of sending drugs and money to the Hejaz Expeditionary Force by air.
The supply situation at Maan had been temporarily improved by the arrival of a convoy
from Jerdun, and, on the 29th Julv, six days supplies were said to be available. The
successful defence of Jerdun by the Turks had had a restraining influence on the Maan
sheikhs, but a plot in which Armenians and Arab officers were involved had been
discovered by the Turks, who made several arrests.
On the 8th August the Imperial Camel Corps detachment captured Mudowere
station (see also paragraph 22) and killed 35 Turks and captured 120 with 2 guns and
3 machine guns.
Following on the capture of Mudowere, Haret el Amara, the next station to the
south, was evacuated on the 9th. On the same day the Ilnd Army Corps decided to
assume the offensive in the Maan area and gave orders for 15 days' food and forage for
3,000 men and 500 animals to be collected at Hasa and Juruf ed Derwish. The attack
column was to consist of the 2/73rd, 3/73rd, l/75th, 2/75th, and a mule volunteer
regiment, while another battalion, the l/l2th, reinforced the Maan garrison.
On the 10th Fakhri Pasha*"' despatched a message of farewell as, in view of the fall
of Mudowere, he considered Medina doomed, and on the 11th the purchasing officer of
the Hejaz Expeditionary Force at Damascus received orders to close his accounts and
make no further purchases.
On the 12th August Sherif Abdulla severely damaged the railway between Toweira
and Bir Jedid and destroyed 2,000 rails, and captured 17 prisoners.
On the same date Fakhri Pasha sent a further despondent message. He considered
that Yelderem were mainly responsible for his predicament, and stated he preferred to
surrender or starve rather than be defeated by the Arabs at Medina, Enver Pasha
expressed his appreciation of Fakhri's difficulties and considered that the onus of
opening the railway developed not on the H.E F. but on Yelderem.
The enemy were reported to be showing considerable interest in the Akhwant
movement centred at Ritawia, 5 days east of Aneize, in Qasim. The Nejd men, in the
service of Plussein, were said to be regarded as infidels by the Akhwan, who attributed
to Hussein the delay over the 1918 Haj.
29. T he situation on the Hejaz railway about the end of August can be summed
up as follows :—
North of Maan railway communication with the north was temporarily cut. The
enemy were endeavouring to restore this communication with the troops and material
locally available, and it was probable that in course of time would effect this object.
* See Appendix M. f See paragraph 23 and note.
(r:i44 19 N B