"دليل الخليج. مجلد I. القسم التاريخي. الأجزاء Iأ و Iب. ج.ج. لوريمر ١٩١٥" [‎٣‎٢‎١] (١٧٨٢/٤٦٤)

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arrogant pretention as Russia has insisted upon in the case of the Northern lake. She
dot s not demand that the Persian Gulf should be a mare clausum against foreign trade.
She does not impose treaties upon humiliated foes, wresting from them the right to flj
their own flag in their own waters. The merchant navies of the world are free to
plough tliese wares, and to fill their holds with incoming or outgoing treasures. But
at least she must and does claim, in return for the sacrifices to which she has submitted,
and the capital which she has sunk, and for the sake of the peace which she is here to
guaid, that no hostile political influence shall introduce its discordant features upon the
scene. A Russian port in the Persian Gulf, that dear dream of so many a patriot from
the Neva or the Volga, would, even in times of peace, import an element of unrest into
the life of the Gulf that would shake the delicate equilibrium so laboriously established,
would wreck a commerce that is valued at many millions sterling, and would let loose
again the passions of jarring nationalities only too ready to fly at each others' throats.
Let Gieat Britain and Russia fight their battles or compose their differences elsewhere,
but let them not turn into a scene of sanguinary conflict the peaceful field of a hard-
won trade. I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia
by any power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the status
quo, and as an intentional provocation to war; and I should impeach the British
minister, who was guilty of acquiescing in snob a surrender, as a traitor to his country. ■
In the first year of his "V iceroyalty^, in a monumental despatch dated
the 21st September 1899 which dealt exhaustively with the whole Persian
problem^ Lord Curzon^ after describing the interests and position of
Britain in the Persian Gulf in terms similar to those used in his book,
submitted to Her Majesty^s Government proposals in regard to the policy
which should be jointly pursued by the Home and Indian Governments
in Persia, especially in Southern Persia and in the Gulf. It was evident
from his recommendations that closer and more responsible contact with
the problem and increased experience had only confirmed him in the
opinion that the maintenance of British political supremacy in the Persian
Gulf was a matter of vital importance to the British Empire.
In relating the events of the next seven years we shall deal in succes- thVsubject
sion with the following matters : the internal affairs, both general and
local, of Persia and Turkey; the nature and objects of foreign activity in
the Gull, principally Russian, French, and German; the significance of
certain Muhammadan forces and movements; the affairs of the Arab
principalities and other territorial divisions in the Persian Gulf and Gulf
of 'Oman with special reference to British and foreign interests and rela
tions ; the response of Britain, in its more purely diplomatic and military
aspects, to foreign activity; and, finally, British official arrangements,
dispositions and undertakings in the Persian Gulf, many of which were
influenced, stimulated, even suggested, at this time by the competition
of foreign powers. Such an arrangement of the subject seems to be that
best lending itself to orderly and logical exposition.