"دليل الخليج. مجلد I. القسم التاريخي. الأجزاء Iأ و Iب. ج.ج. لوريمر ١٩١٥" [‎٦‎٩‎٦] (١٧٨٢/٨٣٩)

696
prolonged by way of Halul Island, of a point 10 miles off Ras Rakan,
and of the isiand of Qjaiyin, to Ras-az-Zor upon the coast near Kuwait
No formal agreement in regard to the line was ever executed ; nor was
any required.
Serieg of
•h<>rt mari
time traces,
1885-42.
The Ten
Y ears'
Maritime
Truce.
1843-53.
British relations with Trucial 'OmSn, 1835-53,
During the eighteen years which followed the conclusion of the first
Maritime Truce^ the relations of the Trucial Shaikhs towards the British
Go\ ernment and towards one another at sea continued to be regulated
by the General Treaty of 18^0, supplemented by a series of maritime
truces similar in their terms to that of 1885. The second and third
truces, concluded on the ISth of April 1S36 and the 15th of April 1837
respectively, were apparently for not more than eight months each; but
the period of the fourth, signed in 1838, was fixed, at the instance of
Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar, at one year. Annual truces were arranged
thereafter in 1839, 1840, 1841 and 184?.; but on the expiration of
e Truce of 1840 a slight interval occurred, by which the Shaikh of
arjah prolited to make a naval attack on the Shaikh of Umm-al-
Qaiwain.
The establishment of permanent peace at sea having been proposed
by Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar in 1837, the attention of the Bombay Gov
ernment was directed to the question; and, in 1841, they expressed a wish
at a truce for more than a year might, if possible, be arranged.
ough the Shaikhs as a whole were not adverse to a lengthened truce,
considerable doubt was felt by Captain Hennell, the Resident, as to the
expe lencj of any change; he feared that a prolonged or permanent
mariUme truce would impose an intolerable strain on the propensities
o the Arabs to wrong-doing and retaliation, and might so lead to a
reakdown of the whole trucial system; and he foresaw that it would
^ antage of the Uawasim, who were predominant at
sea but suffered severely from the depredations of the Bani YSs on land.
It was also apprehended that the difficulty and responsibility of settling
by peaceful means quarrels that would ordinarily be decided by the
swor , a uty which would necessarily devolve on the British Govern-
men as guarantor of the truce, might prove excessive. In the end the
ma ter was left by Government to the experience and discretion of
Oaptain Hennell, who justified the confidence reposed in him by
ego la ing a truce, upon the usual conditions, for an extended period of