"ملف 61/11 VI (D 102) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [ظ‎‎٥] (٥٢٢/٢٣)

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5. When the Deputy Minister stated that this ultimatum, or quasi-
ultimatum, had not been published, and that on the nature of the Imam s ieply
would depend the King's future course of action, I intervened, as described in my
telegram No. 190, to inform him of my instructions in the event of the issue of an
ultimatum. He thereupon endeavoured to define the nature of Ibn Sand's
communication to the Imam as a restatement of the Saudi case and an invitation
to the Imam to give his views thereon. Although earlier in the conversation Fuad
Bey Hamza had stated that the King was well aware of Zeidi ambitions, both
through the Imam's statements to the last Saudi delegation to visit Sana and from
inspired articles in the Arabic press of neighbouring countries, as well latterly
as from the Yemen's sole newspaper the Iman, I accepted his explanation and
agreed to take no further action for the moment beyond acquainting you with
these new developments. I might here say that I have since received information
from a source which in the past has proved most reliable, a source, moreover, in
touch with official circles, to the effect that Ibn Sand's latest communication was
his '' last and decisive '' message, and I may therefore have to address you again
by telegraph in the course of the next few days in regard to the real nature of this
ultimatum.
6. An ultimatum had been prepared, Fuad Bey Hamza continued, and would
be issued, if necessity arose, together with a Green Book which would contain a
complete statement of the Saudi case and which was now in the hands of the
printers, in the course of ten or fourteen days.
7. He went on to speak of the situation should it unfortunately deteriorate
into hostilities. Of the sympathy of His Majesty's Government they had no
doubt, but the Saudi Government would like to feel as assured of the attitude
of the Italian Government. The latter were in treaty relations with Saudi Arabia
and the Saudi Government were sincerely desirous that those relations should
remain friendly, but they (the Italian Government) were also in treaty relations
with the Imam, and should a conflict ensue, might be inclined to lend support to
the Imam as the older friend. I pointed out that this doubt had been raised by
Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman several months ago, and expressed my conviction that
the Italian Government's attitude in the event of hostilities would be strictly
correct. As far as the supply of arms by them to the Imam was concerned, I said,
making use of an argument already used at the Foreign Office with Sheikh Hafiz
Wahba, that the Italians were entitled to trade in munitions and, moreover, had
been doing so for a considerable time before this crisis arose—a point Fuad Bey
Hamza seemed to admit. As he pressed me to request His Majesty's Government
to favour his Government with their views, I promised to inform you that he had
expressed these misgivings. He then asked me point-blank, as Sheikh Abdullah
Suleiman had done (and reported in my telegram No. 184), who, in regard to the
recent representations, had taken the initiative, His Majesty's Government or
the Italian Government ? I answered, as on the previous occasion, that, as far as I
was aware, the demarche was the outcome of joint consultations.
8. The Deputy Minister went on to speak, feelingly, that counsels of modera
tion should be offered to the other side rather than to Ibn Sand, whose patience
and longanimity in dealing with so obstinate, perverse and fractious an individual
as the Imam Yahya had won general recognition. He said that he had gathered
from his recent visit to Riyadh that Ibn Sand was determined to avoid hostilities
at all costs. lor one thing, were the King to ignore the numerous appeals
he had received from Moslems in neighbouring countries, calling upon him to
avoid a fratricidal Arab war, and to take the first step in a war with the Yemen,
he would at once forfeit the sympathy of the whole Islamic world. For another!
the cost of a wai would prove disastrous and the financial situation of this country
was bad enough as it was. But, Fuad Bey tlamza added, any attack on the honour
of the country would be resisted by all the means in their power. He quoted the
Arab proverb to the effect that if the only road that presents itself be a thorny
one, then one is obliged to go that way.
i 9 ' • ^ co ] lcl 1 ude( i ^ describing certain frontier intrigues which, he said, had
been suitably dealt with and denied, on my putting a question to him, that Saudi
troops had crossed the frontier into the Yemen in the neighbourhood of Medi (as
reported m my telegram No. 193). With regard to this denial, however, I am not
altogether satisfied, for strong rumours are current, and are reported by the source
Aw 16 c ? ea J r . lier m thls despatch, that such an infraction of the frontier
at that point by Saudi troops has actually occurred, and it is also said that serious