"ملف 82/27 (VI (F 87 نفط قطر" [و‎‎١‎١‎٤] (٤٥٤/٢٤٢)

2.
on which the concession had been signed, subject to the
approval of H.M.G.
Article 11 ♦ The Company wMlc desiring not to make a
difficulty in their negotiations oy raising an objection were
somewhat apprehensive that the Sheikh might endeavour to
secure armaments on an unjustifiable scale from them with a
view to equipping his forces with machine g^ms, armoured cars,
etc. for the purpose of repelling raids. ^ey would of
course be most reluctant to involve themselves in any such
commitment, not least because any provision of arms by the
Company might expose them to international criticism.
It was agreed after discussion that having regard to
the provisions of Article 3 of the Qatar Treaty of 1916 and
the fact that the question of what provision of arms, etc.
was "sufficient" was open to reference to arbitration, the
Company could probably take the risk involved in accepting
the Sheikh's redraft as it stood#
Article 16 , Provision that the Sheikh's consent should
be necessary to the third arbitrator. It was agreed to
mention this point to the Political Resident. Mr. Mylles felt
confident that the Sheikh (or his son) would in practice agree
to whatever name the Resident suggested. The history of this
proviso was largely that the Sheikh thought that its insertion
would make it less likely that the Resident would nominate
someone who would be entirely unacceptable to the Sheikh and
under the influence of the Company.
Article 17 . The question was raised of what action
H.M.G, would take if the Sheikh, for some frivolous reason,
were to require the removal of the Chief Local Representative.
It was thought that this risk was one which could probably be
faced. In practice it might prove necessary in such an event
to bring political pressure to bear upon the Sheikh.
Article/