"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٣] (٤٣٤/٣٤٥)

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interview the opportunity was taken to mention that the Italians themselves
seemed anxious to keep the Rome understanding alive, and apparently
feared a forward policy on the part of His Majesty’s Government (see
Foreign Office despatch to Jedda, No. 182 of the 24th February).
6. Mr. Rendel added that he understood (from Sheikh Hafiz Wahba)
that His Majesty wished to know the attitude of His Majesty’s Government
. towards his suggestion for an exchange of information about the Yemen, &c.
Mr. Rendel saw no reason why this should not be possible. His Majesty’s
Government would be glad to pass on to Ibn Saud any information of interest
which they could properly communicate to him, though in doing this they
would, of course, be assuming that Ibn Saud was satisfied that there would
be no risk of leakage at the Saudi end.
7. Ibn Saud then turned to Iraq. He had good information, for people
wrote to him from all parts of the Arab world and he had seen many Iraqi
pilgrims, and the reports all tallied with each other. Everyone was suspicious
of the new Iraqi Government and regarded it as not Arab. There had beert*
much to be said against Yasin-al-Hashimi, who had even gone so far as to
ask Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to tell Ibn Saud to beware of the British Govern
ment, but at least his policy was an Arab policy. To the policy of the
present Iraqi Government there were two objections : it was communistic,
and it was under Turkish influence. The Turks had begun by trying to get
possession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and their next aim would be to ac
quire Mosul.
8. Mr. Rendel said that the title of Communist was sometimes misapplied
to any one who favoured economic social reform. He understood that such
reforms were long overdue in Iraq, where there was much extreme poverty,
and it was possible that Hikmet Suleiman’s legislation was necessary, and was
not imposed in any spirit of communism. It might be well, therefore, to
reserve judgment on this point until the Amir Saud and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba
should have seen the situation for themselves during their impending visit
to Bagdad. (Here Ibn Saud said that Hikmet Suleiman did not care a rap for
the poor or for anyone.) As to Turkish influence, Mr. Rendel believed that,
while the maker of the military coup Bakr Sidqi, and some of his
military associates, might be described as pro-Turkish, Hikmet Suleiman
showed signs of wanting to shake himself free of military influence, and the
longer he could maintain his Government, the more hope there was that he
would become less dependent on the army’s support. As to the attitude of
the Turkish Government, a year ago Mr. Rendel would have scouted the sug
gestion that Turkey might embark on a policy of adventure. In this opinion
he had been seriously shaken by Turkey’s Alexandretta policy, but the Turks
had not “ got away with it ” over Alexandretta, and they had, he thought, felt
themselves much isolated at Geneva and had retreated fro m the extreme
position they had taken up. The fact that the Turks had received so marked
a check over Alexandretta ought, he felt, to make them much less likely to
put forward any other similar claims in future.
Second Interview, March 21.
9. Ibn Saud said that he wanted to make some remarks under four
heads :— - !
(1) His relations with His Majesty’s Government. T ,
(2) The Arabs in General.
(3) Palestine.
(4) The future.
The interview went on for over two hours, but never got beyond the first
head. Ibn Saud went over the whole course of his relations with His Majesty’s
Government from the moment when he first entered into communication with
them through the Political Agent at Bahrein, and suggested that their common
interests demanded that the Turks should not be allowed to establish them
selves strongly in the Arabian Peninsula, and received an assurance that His
Majesty’s Government would not allow the Turks to approach him either by
sea or through Koweit. He recited his dealings with Sir Percy Cox during