ملف رقم ١٦٠ لسنة ١٩٠٣ "الخليج الفارسي: قطر؛ تعيين مديرين أتراك؛ مسألة معاهدة الحماية مع قطر" [ظ‎‎١‎١] (٨٦٠/٢٧)

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of her navy’may render task very difficult, if not impossible. Jn any
case, therefore, by one method or another, I. respectfully urge necessity
of adjusting position with Turkey forthwith, and eliminating chronic
elements of friction which have now become dangerous."
The conclusions to which these considerations seem to point are as
follows :—
(1.) It is desirable to conclude treaties with the Katr tribes.
(2.) It is not possible to do so unless we can guarantee them against Turkish
aggression.
(3.) There seem to be three ways of arriving at such a guarantee—
(а) A comprehensive settlement by friendly agreement. The
materials for this do not appear to be forthcoming.
(б) A comprehensive settlement by announcement to the Turks
that we do not recognise their position at Koweit and south
of Ujair, and the translation of that announcement into action
by the removal of all signs of Turkish authority. This would
obviously be a serious measure, but it might perhaps be
taken in reply to some particularly objectionable action on
the part of the Turks, either in the Gulf or elsewhere, such
as will doubtless be forthcoming before long.
(c) A piecemeal settlement. We should make no announcement
of policy ; but as each case arises, instead of protesting,
remove the objectionable Turks. In the case of Koweit
this would also, presumably, mean that we should support
the Sheikh b}^ force in the question of the registration of his
Turkish properties, i.e., guarantee him against the conse
quences of forcibly ejecting any persons whom the Turks
might send to take possession of those properties.
(4.) When the Turkish difficulty has been finally removed by one or
other of these means, the main reason for concluding the
agreements will have disappeared.
It is for the Foreign Office to decide.
7th December 1910.
F. A. H.
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