"مذكرة عن السكك الحديدية الفارسية" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٨٤/٢٢)

18
Lord Curzon went on to explain that, what
Russia really desired, was not a commercial rail
way, but one “ built exclusively by Russian capital,
“ managed and officered entirely by Russian agents,
“ constructed not for commercial but for political
“ and strategical objects, and terminating in a
“ Russian, as distinct from a Persian, port, that
“ would presently be converted not merely into a
“ coaling station, but into a fortified naval base on
“ the Indian Ocean.” The remainder of the minute
dwelt on the serious commercial, political, and
strategical consequences that would follow from
the establishment of Russia in such a commanding
position. British trade would be extinguished, and
the possession of Seistan which would be conferred
by a Russian railway would enable Russia to
menace the entire western flank of Afghanistan,
and exercise on the tribes of Baluchistan and
Mekran a disturbing and anti-British influence.
There would be similar objections to a Russian
“ political ” railway terminating at any port of the
Persian Gulf, whether Mohammerah, Bushire,
Bunder Abbas, or Charbar. (Paragraphs \ 2 to end
of the minute are printed as Appendix 11.)
The discussion of policy closed with the com
munication to the Shah of Lord Lansdowne’s
Despatch No. 2, dated the 6 th January 1902, to
the British Minister at Tehran, from which the
following is an extract : —
“ As regards railways, 1 may remind you that
“ in March 1889 the late Shah of Persia gave a
“ distinct promise in writing that Great Britain
“ should have priority in the construction of a
“ southern railway to Tehran ; that if concessions
“ for railways were given to others in the north a
“ similar concession should be granted to an
“ English Company in the south; and that no
“ southern railway concession should be granted
“ to any foreign Company without consultation
“ with the British Government. This pledge was
“ brought to the notice of the present Shah in April
“ 1900,and was acknowledged by His Majesty to be
“ of continued and binding validity.
“ As regards Seistan, I have quite recently, in
“ my Despatch of the 9th July 1901, directed you
“ to call the attention of the Persian Government
to the interest which this district has for Great
“ Britain on account of its proximity to India and
“ its position on an important trade route between
“ India and Persia, and to state that we regard it
“ as of the utmost importance that it should remain
“ free from the intrusion of foreign authority in any
“ shape.”
Lord Lansdowne's Despatch No. 2, 6th
January 1902.
(P. 6.)
Pol. 1732/02.
* paragraph 16.
19. In the following year, on the 5th May, Lord
Lansdowne made in the I louse of Lords the decla
rationthat “ we should regard the establishment of
“ a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian
“ Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace
“ to British interests, and we should certainly resist
“ it with all the means at our disposal.” lie added
Lord Lansdowne’s Declaration of
5th May 1903.
* Parliamentary Debates, Fourth
Sexies, Vol. 121, pp. 1348 and 1350.