ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الثاني "المحمرة: الوضع. نزاع الشيخ مع والي البصرة. تقليد الشيخ وساماً. تجديد التطمينات للشيخ". [و‎‎١‎٠] (٥٦٦/٢٤)

s
Dated 11th June 1914.
Pol. 2255.
(Immediate.)
India Office, Whitehall,
29th June 1914.
Sir,
In forwarding for the information of the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs enclosed copy
of a telegram'^' from the Government of India, the
Secretary of State for India desires to offer the
following observations upon the measures recom
mended by them for the rehabilitation of British
interests in South Persia.
2. The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the
Government of India that these measures, initiated
and carried out in the spirit which animates His
Majesty’s Government, would not only be fully
compatible with, but would tend actively to
promote, the independence and integrity of Persia.
But he is constrained to admit that they would not
generally be so regarded, while they might easily
furnish a pretext to the Russian Government for
the initiation of similar measures in a contrary
spirit. These considerations must be faced from
the outset, but need not be deterrent.
3. It may be more difficult to reconcile the
proposed measures with the other obligations of
His Majesty’s Government. It is obvious that they
could not be undertaken without a previous under
standing with Russia, and her probable attitude
may be inferred from the reproach made in
connexion with the Trans-Persian Railway, that
His Majesty’s Government seemed to be seeking a
monopoly (of railway construction) in the neutral
sphere. Thus the whole question of the Con
vention might be raised, and proposals for the
enlargement of the British sphere be forced
upon us.
4. As regards that contingency, Lord Crewe
shares the objections felt by the Government of
India to raising the question of abolishing the
neutral sphere. Apart from considerations of
enlarged responsibilities, increased expense, and
possible effect on Moslem sentiment, British com
mercial and political interests are so distributed
over the neutral sphere as to make relinquish
ment of any portion of it to Russia difficult and
hazardous. .
An examination of the map will render discus
sion of this point superfluous, but it is clearly not
probable that it will be accepted by Russia. The
object of His Majesty s Government should, there
fore, be to secure our position in the Gulf and the
The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.
S. 245.