ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ١٠ "الحدود الشمالية الغربية: البعثة الروسية المقترحة المختصة بعلم الحيوان" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٢] (٦٦٤/١٧٥)

EASTEEN.
I June 30.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
~ T — —
Section 1,
[95840] No. 1.
... . General Sir I']. Allenby to Earl Gurzon.—(Received June 30.)
(.No. 278.) '
f ± a . Cairo, June 15, 1919.
W11H reference to mj despatch No. 269 of the 11th June, I have the honour to
forward copies of a‘further note by Captain Garland, of the Arab Bureau, carrying on
e narrative of events connected with the Khurma dispute to the 10th June. °
I have, &c.
E. H. H. ALLENBY.
Enclosure in No. 1.
A'oie by Captain Garland on the Khurma Dispute.
Latest Information.
r ®P orts / rom Jeddah have confirmed the completeness of Abdullah’s defeat
at larabah According to a telegram sent by the King to Emir Feisal, the “martyrs”
L.e., bhereefian killed) amounted to 250, including several Ateibah Sheikhs, and also
^ w ^° was Abdullah’s Major-General Commanding the so-called “ division ”
0 regular troops. Emirs Abdullah and Shakir were themselves slightly wounded all
guns and machine guns and two-thirds of the supplies were lost, and only one-tenth of
the mule mounted infantry got away.
,, is worthy of note that, although they had had previous warning of the nio-ht
attack, the regular officers who got away did so in their night attire. It was ever one
or the JDagdadi officers maxims not to allow military duties to interfere with his
nights rest and during the war, outposts, pickets/and the like were invariably
dispensed with by the Hedjaz armies.
The 10,000 Bedouin originally reported to be with Abdullah seem to have melted
away and, as Colonel Bassett remarks, “ everything points to the majority of the tribal
e emen s which profess allegiance to King Hussein being absolutely unreliable.A
consoling feature is that the captors of the guns, &c., have no followers trained in their
manipulation and employment.
In spite of the King’s assertion that Ibn Saud reinforced Tarabah and Khurma,
TLu u i VieW to * ttaGk ' n g Abdullah, no enemy advance from Tarabah is reported,
bdullah, according to the Kmg, is now “ remaining on the defensive,” but both he and
ie King fear an advance by Ibn Saud on Taif and Mecca.
t is thought however, that Ibn Saud will now rest content with his success and
ns reoccupation of TarabaL He has common sense enough to realise that any further
ac ^ a nce 0 wards the Hedjaz cities would mean sacrificing our friendship, subsidy,
and neip, and he must realise that we possess the means to punish him even if he knows
!j ^ pes not. It seems probable that His Britannic Maiestv’s Government’s
on eis o \\i i iaw horn larabah will have the desired effect when he gets them.
3 © fact that the Ikhwan have not advanced from Tarabah since they recaptured
1 en s o s ow that Ibn Saud has them under some sort of control, and if the more
fanatical elements had intended to raid Taif without his authority, they would surelv
have moved towards it by this time.
On the arrival of our aeroplanes, the King will no doubt insist on immediate
puni ive bombing raids of Tarabah, Khurma, and other Ikhwan camps, but it appears
necessary that the possible results of such action should be well considered before •
un er a mg it. from every point of view it will be infinitely better if Ibn Saud can
6 C 1 / m P e e( ^ withdraw by political pressure from Bagdad, as aeroplane bombing
W °u increase the hatred and ill-will between Nejd and Mecca, would render future
r ^°fi ( / lia t lon more difficult, would henceforth affect the hospitality extended to British
° < f. ia r T ve nnrs through Nejd, and might quite conceivably precipitate a wholesale
con agration, besides possibly forming matter (suitably distorted) for Indian anti-
Shereefian propaganda. v ^
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