"١/١ المجلد II العلاقات الكويتية السعودية" [و‎‎٥‎٧] (٥٣٤/١٢٢)

MH, hinNDEL
0.
Taere were obvious arguments--for doing so, for were we
not to intervene when misgovernment had reached a certain
pitch it would be most difficult for us to justify a re
fusal to allow foreign governments which mig^t be affected
to take steps to protect the interests of their nationals.
e did not think that there need be any apprehension in
the case of F oweip that we would fail to bring pressure on
a Sheikh who was abusing his position, once it became
necessary to do so. The case for early intervention
would probably be stronger now that the Gulf was so much
more in the public eye.
The meeting then went on to consider relations between
Ibn Gaud and Koweit. SIR AIDITSW RYAH stated that he had
been impressed by the apparent weakness of His Majesty's
Government's position vis-a-vis of Ibn Baud with regard
to Koweit. His ! ajesty's Government were not strongly
placed, when it became necessary to warn Ibn Baud to keep
his hands off Koweit, since they were committed to maintain
ing that Koweit was technically an independent State. A
case in point had been the Saudi intrusions into Koweit
territory referred to in paragraph 3 of his note, when
Saudi officials had performed acts of authority within the
limits of the sheikhdom. COLO EL FOWLE pointed out that
in fact our treaty engagements did entitle us to prevent
foreign Powers from dealing direct with the sheikh. Ibn
Saud had certainly been informed of the special relations
existing between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government.
Speaking generally, he added that infact little trouble
was likely to be experienced with foreigners in Koweit,so
long as it remained a Beduin town reded by a Beduin Sheikh
and not, like Bahrain, p, relatively cosmopolitan commercial
centre. If,however,oil were discovered v/ithin the uheikh-
aom, it was possible the/t difficulties might arise.