مجموعة ٦/٨٤ "اليمن: موقف حكومة اليمن من النزاع الإيطالي-الإثيوبي. سياسة الحكومة البريطانية في حالة احتلال إيطاليا لأراضٍ يمنية." [و‎‎١‎١‎٠] (٦٩٩/٢١٩)

possibility of Italy establishing herself in Saudi Arabia, through the training and
controlling of Saudi aviation, has formed the subject of correspondence with His
Majesty’s Minister at Jedda (see correspondence ending with your despatch
No. 13 32 of the 2nd December, 1936). Equally notorious is the Italian penetration
of the Yemen, through her agents disguised in civil functions (e.q., doctors)—
through her intrigues in view of the succession of the old and sick Imam—
through her provision of arms and financial facilities—through the reality of the
menace she presents to the Yemen since the establishment of her East African
Empire. It is possible that the Imam’s death is not so near as is repeatedly
predicted, but his eventual disappearance is likely to afford an opportunity for
much fishing in troubled waters, caused by rivalries among the Imam’s sons and
certain tribal elements. Italy will, no doubt, make the most of any opportunities
afforded to her by any internal confusion in the Yemen.
18. It is obvious that all this Italian effort will be greatly facilitated by the
continuance and development of Arab hostility to Great Britain, owing to an
unsettled situation in Palestine. The Arabs are aware of the Italian danger to
themselves, but despair is a bad counsellor, and, if the choice were to appear to
them to lie between the Zionist absorption in Palestine, with its menace to the
Arab world generally, and of co-operation with Italy against Great Britain and
France, who, after all, are in the position of standing in the way of Arab aspira
tions, it is greatly to be feared that the second alternative might appear to them
the least fatal.
19. It is not within my province to express opinions regarding the internal
problem of Palestine, and it is only on the external reactions to that problem that
I am venturing to dwell. Whatever may be the necessities of the Palestinian
issue, I would earnestly urge that, anyhow, it be not examined in isolation from
our whole position in the Near East, and that we consider carefully whether we
have the means of maintaining our position in the Near East against an Italian
thrust facilitated by Arab co-operation, based on despair of us and an appre
hensive respect of Italian power as demonstrated by the conquest of Abyssinia.
20 I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty’s High Commis
sioner for Palestine, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Bagdad, and His Majesty’s
Minister at Jedda.
I have. &c.
MILES W. LAMPSON,
High Commissioner.
Enclosure.
Note by the Sudan Government Intelligence Officer, dated October 31, 1936, on
Impressions and Information gathered during his Visits to Egypt, Syria
and Palestine in the Summer of 1936.
(Secret.)
THERE have been three predominant topics of interest in the Near East
this summer :—
(a) The Italo-Abyssinian affair and its termination:
(b) The Palestine troubles; and
{c) The treaties between England and Egypt and between France and
Syria.
The treaties are the only bright spot in an otherwise very gloomy picture.
2. I am sorry to state that as a result of the Italo-Abyssinian business
British prestige has suffered an extremely severe set-back in the Near East.
Italy’s bold and successful adventure is regarded everywhere as a serious reverse
for the British Empire; for the League aspect of the matter is considered to be
nothing more than an elaborate piece of window-dressing designed to camouflage
an essentially Imperialist duel between Britain and Italy—and for the first time
the Arab and Islamic world has seen the British Empire successfully challenged
over a big issue in and around the Mediterranean basin. The Spanish civil war,
coming immediately on top of the Italian victory in Abyssinia, and implying (as
it seems to most observers to imply) another Fascist triumph to the detriment of
British and French democracy, has unfortunately enhanced the newly created
[881 ff—1] ' b 2