مجموعة ٦/٨٤ "اليمن: موقف حكومة اليمن من النزاع الإيطالي-الإثيوبي. سياسة الحكومة البريطانية في حالة احتلال إيطاليا لأراضٍ يمنية." [و‎‎١‎٢‎٠] (٦٩٩/٢٣٩)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia). February 24. 1937.
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 784/27/91] Copy No.
Mr. Eden to Sir E. Drummond (Rome).
(No. 182.)
Sir, Foreign Office, February 24, 1937.
THE counsellor of the Italian Embassy called here on the 3rd February in
order to discuss Anglo-Italian relations in the Red Sea area. He said that the
Italian Government had been rendered uneasy at the recent journeys of Captain
Seager (the British frontier officer on the Aden-Yemeni frontier) from Aden to
Sanaa, and of Mr. Philby to the Hadramaut. Signor Crolla seemed rather
confused about these journeys, and at times spoke of Mr. Philby’s journeys to
the coast of the Persian Gulf, where, as was explained to him, Mr. Philby had
not been for many years. But it appeared that the reference to these journeys
was merely intended to introduce the subject, and that the real object of his visit
was to say that Italy relied entirely on, and held firmly to, the Rome under
standing of 1927. and to express the hope that His Majesty’s Government
themselves were prepared to continue equally to base themselves on that
instrument.
2. Signor Crolla was told in reply that it must be self-evident that His
Majesty’s Government could have no ambitions in the Arabian peninsula, and no
wish to increase their responsibilities by adopting any kind of forward policy
beyond the areas already under their sovereignty or protection. Their policy, as
the Italian Government must know, was the maintenance of the status quo.
3. As regards the journeys to which Signor Crolla had particularly alluded,
Captain Seager was, as the Italian Government were aware, the British frontier
officer on the Aden-Yemeni frontier. His Majesty’s Government had no repre
sentatives in the Yemen, but the fact that they had a common frontier with that
country naturally led to the necessity for discussing various frontier questions of
common interest. In the circumstances, it seemed entirely natural that Captain
Seager should go to Sanaa from time to time, in the ordinary course of his work
as a frontier officer, in order to keep in contact with the Yemeni officials. As
regards Mr. Philby, it was no doubt universally believed abroad that he was a
British agent, but it must be sufficiently obvious that such activities as his recent
incursion into the Aden Protectorate were hardly those of a British agent.
Signor Crolla was then given a brief account of Mr. Philby’s career, and told
that the Italian Government should not be misled by the ridiculous reports to
which Mr. Philby’s adventures inevitably gave rise. He eventually said that the
Italian Government were under no misapprehension on this point and did not
take Mr. Philby seriously. He did not explain, however, why he had referred
to him at the outset of the conversation.
4. Signor Crolla was then told that, while it. seemed fairly clear that His
Majesty's Government could have no conceivable object in attempting to extend
their responsibilities in Arabia, the position was not so simple as regards Italy.
Italy made no secret of having embarked on a forward policy, and. whatever the
attitude of the authorities in Rome might be. it could not be denied that there
had been a great deal of loose talk in local Italian military and naval circles
about the obvious strategic advantages which Italy might obtain if she secured
a foothold in the Yemen. It was no doubt unnecessary to attach excessive
importance to such remarks, but this kind of talk had unquestionably created a
great deal of uneasiness in certain quarters.
5. Signor Crolla said that any such uneasiness was entirely unjustified.
Italy had her hands more than full in Abyssinia, and the last thing she wanted
was an Arabian adventure. In any case, her policy was to adhere firmly to the
undertakings of the Rome understanding of 1927. and he wished to give a formal
and categorical assurance to this effect. The Italian Government, for their part,
had. he repeated, certainly felt some uneasiness at Captain Seager’s journev!
There had been reports to the effect that he had discussed with the Imam the
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