مجموعة ٦/٨٤ "اليمن: موقف حكومة اليمن من النزاع الإيطالي-الإثيوبي. سياسة الحكومة البريطانية في حالة احتلال إيطاليا لأراضٍ يمنية." [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٥] (٦٩٩/٢٥٠)

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himself free of military influence, and the longer he could maintain his Govern
ment, the more hope there was that he would become less dependent on the army s
support. As to the attitude of the Turkish Government, a year ago Mr. Rendel
would have scouted the suggestion that Turkey might embark on a policy of
adventure. In this opinion he had been seriously shaken by Turkey’s
Alexandretta policy, but the Turks had not “got away with it” over *
Alexandretta. and they had, he thought, felt themselves much isolated at Geneva
and had retreated from the extreme position they had taken up. The fact that
the Turks had received so marked a check over Alexandretta ought, he felt, to
make them much less likely to put forward any other similar claims in future.
Second Interview, March 21.
9. Ibn Saud said that he wanted to make some remarks under four heads : —
(1) His relations with His Majesty’s Government.
(2) The Arabs in general.
(3) Palestine.
(4) The future.
The interview went on for over two hours, but never got beyond the head.
Ibn Saud went over the whole course of his relations with His Majesty s Govern
ment from the moment when he first entered into communication with them
through the Political Agent at Bahrein, and suggested that their common
interests demanded that the Turks should not be allowed to establish themselves
strongly in the Arabian Peninsula, and received an assurance that His Majesty s
Government would not allow the Turks to approach him either by sea or through
Koweit. He recited his dealings with Sir Percy Cox during the war, recalled the
loyalty with which he had offered to help the feherif Hussein against the Turks,
and spoke of the “guarantees” which he had received from Sir Percy Cox.
Nothing whatever had come of these “ guarantees, though he had been promised
“all sorts of things.” He had assisted the Arab policy of His Majesty’s
Government by communicating to them the written and oral offers which he
received from the Turks as an inducement to him to join them against Hussein—
offers which he refused, alleging that he could not move against the British
because they were his neighbours on the Gulf, and saying that, in any case, he
could not join the Turks when they were slaughtering Arabs. At first he even
told His Majesty’s Government that he would accept Hussein as King of the
Arabs, but later he was obliged to withdraw this offer. He told Hussein that
the resources in money and arms which were supplied by the British were being
wasted through being dealt out to the various sheikhs according to the number
of followers they said they had, and asked that, if he sent his son and some men
to help, they should only be given arms for themselves and food to eat, and
Hussein had replied that Ibn Saud must be either mad or drunk. Ibn Saud
thereupon informed the British Government that he must lay down two
conditions : that he would not recognise Hussein as King of the Arabs, though
he did not object to his being King of the Hejaz. and that when the war was over
His Majesty’s Government should allow him to settle his own scores with
Hussein. He had always listened to the advice of His Majesty’s Government,
even to his own hurt. On more than one occasion he had fallen out with his chief
supporters, the Ikhwan, for that reason, e.g., when he retook Turaba, which the
Sherifians had unjustly occupied, and His Majesty’s Government asked him not
to go any further; when he refrained at the request of His Majesty’s Government
from taking Aqaba, where the ex-King Hussein was staying, and Maan; and
when he listened to the mediation of the British agent at Jedda and ensured the
peaceful occupation of the city to the disappointment of some of his followers.
For all this loyal support, and after all the promises made to him, what had he
got? Nothing whatever. On the contrary !
10. He would put his complaints under three heads :—
(a) His Majesty’s Government had not given him the help he needed.
(b) Their boundary policy was always squeezing him in.
(c) By their Gulf policy they tried to make him dependent commercially on
Koweit and Bahrein.