مجموعة ١/١٥ "شؤون مصر: الوضع العام ١٩٣١؛ المعاهدة البريطانية المصرية، ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٢‎١] (٤٩٣/٤٢)

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self-government within the framework of
permanent unity with Egypt under the
Egyptian Crown.” In his first speech in
the Chamber of Deputies Nokrashi Pasha
declared that “ in affirming the permanent
unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the
Crown of Egypt we are only expressing
thfc^ull and desire of the inhabitants of
this valley” and again that “everybody
must know that when I say ‘ unity of
Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian
Crown ’ I mean a permanent unity ....
This unity derives from the will of the
people of the valley, the will of the people
of Egypt and that of the people of the
Sudan without distinction .... I repeat
that the unity of Egypt and the Sudan will
continue always and that no Egyptian
could admit the separation of Egypt and
the Sudan.”
63. In an appreciation dated 18th
December, His Majesty’s Charge
d’Affaires said that “ the various declara
tions made by Sidky and the Governor-
General have excited the Egyptian public
to a point where no Egyptian Prime
Minister, least of all the head of a minority
Government, could dare to go against it.
The Egyptian refusal to admit the right
of the Sudan to secede is largely based on
the belief that the British are encouraging
the Sudanese to secede in' order to complete
their policy of getting the Egyptians out
preparatory to taking over themselves. No
Egyptian can believe in the existence of a
Sudanese public opinion, or in the possi
bility of the Sudanese being allowed to
express their opinions in the Sudan.”
64. Against this ominous background
His Majesty’s Ambassador returned to
Egypt on 20th December. There then
ensued a series of stubborn arguments in
the course of which Nokrashi Pasha
pressed repeatedly for a unilateral state
ment that (») His Majesty’s Government
had no intention of encouraging the
Sudanese to separate themselves from
Egypt, and (b) that if the Sudanese even
tually chose to remain united with Egypt
His Majesty’s Government would put no
obstacle in the way and would be happy to
see this happen. Nokrashi justified his
insistence on the ground of the inflamed
state of Egyptian opinion; but he showed
no disposition whatever to agree, in return,
to the joint statement for which His
Majesty’s Government continued to press
as an alternative to an exchange of letters
which Nokrashi, like Sidky, rejected.
Furthermore, Nokrashi hinted broadly that
the present deadlock could not be removed
except by the amendment of the Bevin-
Sidky protocol. All he would concede was
that a statement by His Majesty’s Govern
ment on the lines suggested would make
“conversations more fruitful.” Public
opinion in Egypt was further excited by
the unauthorised disclosure of an address
given by the Governor-General of the
Sudan to Sudanese notables at El Obeid,
and by declarations also made, on his
return to Khartoum from London, by Sayed
Abdel Rahman. On 31st December
Nokrashi made a statement in the Chamber
of Deputies in which he insisted that His
Majesty’s Government must indicate their
precise intentions in the Sudan, since it
was inconceivable that Egypt could sacri
fice her security by allowing the propaga
tion in the Sudan of a policy tending
towards separation.
65. On 4th January, 1947, the Foreign
Secretary telegraphed a fresh proposal to
His Majesty’s Ambassador for communi
cation to Nokrashi. This proposal, which,
with the accompanying review of the policy
of His Majesty’s Government in the
Sudan, is reproduced in Annex 7, con
sisted of two alternatives either (a) the
signature of the treaty of mutual assis
tance including the evacuation protocol
but excluding the Sudan protocol, with an
understanding that the Convention of 1899
and article 11 of the 1936 treaty would
remain in force, to be followed by a
conference on the Sudan question at which
the United Kingdom. Egypt and the Sudan
would be represented, or (b) signature of
all the treaty drafts but on the under
standings (1) that the right of the Sudanese
to choose their status was not restricted,
(2) that, whatever the choice, a solemn
pledge would be given by His Majesty’s
Government that safeguards would be
provided for Egypt’s permanent interests.
Further, if either alternative were
accepted. His Majesty’s Government would
be prepared to make the unilateral state
ment demanded by Nokrashi.
66. Two conversations followed between
Nokrashi and Sir R. Campbell, the upshot
of which was that Nokrashi suggested
what was virtually a new Sudan Protocol
in the form of terms of reference to a
conference. His draft ran as follows :—
“ The High Contracting Parties, with
a view to assuring the well-being of the
Sudanese, the development of their
interests and their active preparation
for self-government on the basis of the
unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the
common Crown of Egypt, agree to enter
immediately on a conference on the