"ملف ٢/ ٢ VI التهريب بين الكويت والعراق" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٨] (٣٨٦/٢٦٦)

would probably include air patrols, searchlights at short intervals
on the frontier etc. It was probable that the moment the Iraqis
finally realised that the Sheikh was determined to do nothing to
meet them, these plans would be put into effect. Mr.Kendel drew
attention to the fact that it would be extremely difficult for us
to secure the lifting of such a blockade once it had been imposed,
and expense had been incurred in putting it into effect.
9. Sir T.Fowle said that he thought the situation might
be eased if the Iraqis would at least agree to the demarcation of
the frontier between Koweit and Iraq. Sir A.Clark Kerr and
Mr.Rendel pointed out in reply that there was no reason why the
Iraqis, from their point of view, should agree to anything at all
in regard to Koweit. Their answer to any such proposals would be
"What are we going to get out of this?". The Iraqis were at
present so annoyed with the Sheikh of Koweit that they would
certainly do nothing to meet his wishes without a very substantial
quid oro quo . This the Sheikh of Koweit had steadily refused
to offer them.
10. Sir T.Fowle urged that it was in accordance with
international custom that a frontier commission should be appointed
would not this furnish a good reason for pressing the Iraqis to
agree to it? Mr.Rendel pointed out that this argument only applied
when nations were friendly. Frontier commissions had only been
established with Iraq ! s other neighbours after general settlement
had been reached with each. This was so in the case of Turkey,
Syria and Persia, where it had been impossible to dojanything about
frontier commissions until general relations had been established on
a satisfactory basis.
11. Sir A.Clark Kerr pointed out that, in the case of Koweit,
the Iraqis regarded the Sheikh as a thoroughly unsatisfactory and
unfriendly neighbour who was nothing but a nuisance and for whom
they
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