"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎٧‎٧] (٤٥٤/١٥٩)

134 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
ostensibly co-operating with the Turkish troops, has just
sent in an emissary to convey his submission and intimate
his wish to come in and hand over four thousand rifles
received or seized by him from the Turks and it is hoped
that the neutrality if not the active co-operation of the
tribes can be secured by judicious diplomacy. Effect of the
recent defeat has been very great, and if advance is made
before it wears off and while cool season lasts Baghdad
will in all probability fall into our hands very easily. After
earnest consideration of the arguments for and against
I find it difficult to see how we can well avoid taking over
Baghdad. We can hardly allow Turkey to retain posses
sion and make difficulties for us at Basra ; nor can we
allow any other Power to take it; but once in occupation
we must remain, for we could not possibly allow the Turks
to return after accepting from Arabs co-operation afforded
on the understanding that the Turkish regime had dis
appeared for good. It is also a matter for consideration
that there are some thirty British subjects detained there
whom we need to release. I may mention that I sent
Major Shakespear to Ibn Saud with instructions to get
him to come north and to remain with him in case we
wanted him to assist us with the tribes beyond Basra.
I shall report officially in due course arrangements we are
making for administration of Basra.”
General Barrett approved of the despatch of this telegram,
thinking that in view 7 of the possibility of a later advance up
the figris there were obvious advantages in ventilating the
subject as soon as possible. The resulting reply was likely to
show the intentions of H.M. Government and both General
Barrett and Sir P. Cox were anxious to know these, to help
them in their military and political plans and policy. As
General Barrett was led to believe that Arab co-operation and
support w 7 ould be forthcoming to the desired extent, he con
sidered at that time that an advance to Amara would be both
feasible and expedient. It was not till nearly two months later
that force of circumstances* brought home to him that his
force would be compelled to remain on the defensive.
* As will be seen later these were : the failure of the Arabs to afford the
expected co-operation and support; the increasing strength of the "lurks,
the lack of aeroplanes and light draught gunboats ; and the indications
that the threatening frontier and internal situations in India were likely to
interfere with the despatch of reinforcements.