مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [و‎‎١‎٠] (٧٦١/١٩)

i have the honour to transmit to ^ou herewith an account drawn up
Mr. Wall of the five interviews which King Abdul Aziz granted me during his p r
stay in Jedda.
2. 1 have asked Mr. Wall to reproduce as closely as possible the King’s n
own words, as in this way a far clearer picture can be formed of the spirit and J/
the wisdom of this truly great man. ‘
3. King Abdul Aziz Ibn Baud’s present most friendly attitude is due
in large measure to his genuine appreciation of the generous and helpful attitude
of His Majesty’s Government in these most difficult times. Owing to the
serious drop in his two sources of revenue, pilgrimage and oil, he has found
himself with a revenue of approximately 10 per cent, of his expenditure.
Export restrictions imposed by all countries surrounding him and the scarcity
of shipping space has rendered the supplying of his country with sufficient food,
motor transport and other necessities a most difficult question. His Majesty
has genuinely appreciated the efforts which have been made to solve this problem,
more vital to this than to surrounding countries, as Saudi Arabia, which grows
practically no food and has no industries, is dependent on imports for its
existence.
4. The King’s policy is based on the firm conviction that the interests
of the Arab world lie in the victory of the Allied nations and in a continuation of,
I and, indeed, an increase in, British influence in the Near East. As will be seen
from the accompanying record, His Majesty does not believe in a union of
existing Arab States, each of whom, he says, has its own characteristics. What
he hopes for is, that all Arab States, whilst remaining independent of one another,
will be united by the common bond of friendship and closest co-operation with
the British. Times have changed and weak States cannot stand alone, and unless
the Arab States look to Britain for protection against external aggression and
to act as intermediary in their disputes one with another they will inevitably
fall under some foreign domination.
5. The King’s statement, that we do not need to do any propaganda as he
himself is our best and most effective propagandist, is literally true. The King
has consistently, from the outbreak of war, backed the Allies to win, grieved
over their set-backs and rejoiced in their successes. Three examples will serve
to illustrate his attitude. When France fell, he sent me a personal message
expressing grief at the difficulties which the British would now have to face
but assuring me of his full confidence in a final British victory. When
H.M.S. Hood was lost and certain of his counsellors suggested that even on sea
the British were being beaten, he bade them have patience for a few days, and
when the Bismarck was sunk these same counsellors were made to stand up and
clap. His religious advisers, the Ulema of Nejd, criticised him for his distress
over General Rommel’s advance into Egypt, saying, that he, a Moslem, was
endangering his health and reducing himself to a mental state, which was
causing him to neglect his duty, over a quarrel between unbelievers. His
Majesty berated his critics most soundly, pointing out at the end of his lecture
on the reasons for his policy, that his friends, the British, were certainly
Christians and not Moslems but that, were it not for their generosity and help
and their success in keeping Rommel out of Egypt, they, the Ulema, would have
no food in their bellies and no clothes on their backs.
6. Ibn Saud’s views on the present position of Germany are interesting
and picturesque. He likeris Hitler to a man who has stuffed himself with much
and varied food (the countries of Europe) in the belief that he will derive great
strength from his meals. But he has swallowed, not nourishing food, but a
number of vipers and scorpions, and whilst these tear at his vitak
Britain, America and Russia, attack him.
[37—29]
C-0
(0 -S
y