مجموعة ١٥/٦ : "سوريا: الإدارة. مسألة عرض العرش على الملك فيصل ملك العراق". [و‎‎١‎٢‎٨] (٤٩٧/٢٥٥)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Syria).
CONFIDENTIAL.
r\
[E mQ/i20/S9]
April 5, 1933.
Section 1.
19 3 c
No. 1.
Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 5.)
(No. 482.)
Sir, Paris, March 31, 1933.
I HAVE the honour to report that in the course of a debate upon the
estimates for overseas defence which took place in the Chamber yesterday
M. Daladier, President of the Council of Ministers, made a noteworthy speech
in reply to a Socialist motion that the French mandate for Syria should be
terminated. M. Sixte-Quenin, who was the principal Socialist speaker, had
pointed out that Great Britain had terminated her mandate over Iraq, and urged
that it was the duty of France from every point of view to do the same. He had
claimed that the sacrifices, particularly in the monetary sphere, which France
was being called upon to make in Syria were out of all proportion to the beneficial
results which were being obtained.
2. M. Daladier, in his reply, said that France's mission in Syria was to
bring the country to the point where political independence could be accorded to
her, and it was that sole consideration which was shaping French policy in
Syrian affairs. The situation differed entirely from that which obtained in the
neighbouring country of Iraq. England had been able to grant independence to
the latter on account of the homogeneity of the population, who had evolved in
the course of centuries what might be called a collective conscience. In Syria,
however, there existed an extensive variety, almost a mosaic it mi^ht be termed,
of races and religions. Religious disputes always had a more serious aspect in
Eastern than in Western countries, and religious difficulties in this case marched
hand in hand with economic and ethical difficulties, all of which increased the
task which faced the Administration.
3. M. Daladier recalled that in October 1932 M. Ponsot, the High
Commissioner, had been instructed to begin negotiations at Damascus for the
signature of a Franco-Syrian Treaty of Alliance, an indispensable preliminary
to the admission of the new State into the League of Nations. The budget for
Syria was certainly no light one, but he would observe that it had decreased by
34 millions since 1932 and by 68 millions since the year before that. To reduce it
still further would be to run the risk of allowing serious internecine warfare to
break out. If that happened, then either another Power would be forced to
interfere, perhaps with no ultimate advantage to Syrian liberty or, alternatively,
a large and costly expeditionary force would have to be sent from France. The
Government were determined not to do anything in Syria to compromise the
beneficial results which had already been obtained.
4. M. Daladier concluded by pointing out that France had scrupulously
observed the engagements upon which she had entered with the League of
Nations. Syria would as soon as possible take her seat at Geneva with her sister
nations, but it was essential, particularly in the interests of the numerous units
which made up the Syrian population, that the treaty of alliance should be
signed first.
I have, &c.
TYRRELL.
[767 e—1]