مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٤) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر." [و‎‎٨‎٣] (٨٤٣/١٦٥)

7. I have redrawn above the familiar picture of Ibn Saud searching year
after year for normal sources of revenue, and thrown back time after time on the
most invidious, viz., levy of toll upon Moslems making the pilgrimage to the
shrine of Allah. It would not be surprising if this disposed him to class his
country with the “ have-nots.” And it happens that with the exception of the
Yemen, which he refrained from annexing in 1935, partly out of consideration for
pan-Arab feeling, but partly no doubt for fear of Italy, he sees around him on
the Arabian Peninsula more than one territory which he could absorb but for
His Majesty’s Government, and whose absorption would be to his economic
advantage. This does not apply to the south, for whatever political attraction
the Hadhramaut may have for him, it contains no obvious form of material wealth.
But on the Persian Gulf the situation is different. There is one small sheikh in
possession of the fine natural harbour of Koweit and a pearl fishery, and in far too
favourable a position for smuggling into Saudi territory. Another sheikh so
small that Ibn Saud always refers to him by a familiar nickname, not only claims
the whole of the Qatar Peninsula, including a hill that Ibn Saud particularly
wants for himself, but has granted an oil concession like an independent
sovereign. Running down the coast are various insignificant people whose only
purpose in life seems to be to bar Ibn Saud from the sea, from any oil that may
be discovered there, and from any pickings that might be got out of Imperial
Airways. Finally, there is Bahrein, which used to belong to Ibn Saud’s
ancestors but now stands more or less on its own feet, and which, moreover, has
an oil well gushing away as if in mockery of the miserable seepings in the wells
which have been bored in Hasa, And in all these territories His Majesty’s
Government have “ interests ” which prevent their being absorbed, as much to
their own as to the general advantage, in Saudi iVrabia. Such is the picture
which Ibn Saud may be expected to paint to himself.
8. In these circumstances it is reasonable to suppose that although
Ibn Saud seems to have decided that on the whole His Majesty’s Government are
to be preferred to the Italians as friends, the recognition of our interests in
Arabia puts a great strain upon a monarch who is not only ambitious but probably
insolvent too. It might be argued that the poorer Ibn Saud is the less likely he
is to engage in a policy of adventure, but my own opinion is that on the whole a
more generous view is justified, viz., that anything that increases his legitimate
revenue is to be welcomed by His Majesty’s Government, and any expenditure
that might embarrass his finances is to be deprecated. To increase his revenue is
not in our power, for without giving pilgrims money, as the Italians have done
this year for propaganda purposes, we can hardly do more to facilitate the
accomplishment of the pilgrimage by British pilgrims than is done already. We
can, however, apply the second principle to any scheme which comes up for
consideration. In my despatch No. 20, dated the 10th February, I applied this
principle to the suggestion that His Majesty’s Government might perhaps help
in the reconstruction of the Saudi portion of the Hejaz Railway, and opposed it
chiefly on the ground that the railway would be a financial liability to Ibn Saud
and not an asset. If it could be shown that the railway would not be a burden
on Saudi finances, the proposal would, I think, deserve reconsideration. The
principle enters into the consideration of other questions affecting the relations
of His Majesty’s Government with Saudi Arabia, but it is unnecessary to go into
details here.
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD