مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٤) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر." [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٨٤٣/٢١٠)

drawn myself as a result of my observations from the air (copy attached).() I
left him a duplicate of this sketch, which showed unmistakably that the Jebei
Naksh is geographically an integral part of the Jebei Dukhan and of the Qatar
Peninsula. I pointed out that the obvious line for the frontier of the peninsula
ran across the flat sand south of the Jebei, and I developed the obvious general
arguments against establishing unnatural and unsound frontier lines.
7. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin replied that the King could legitimately claim a
great deal more than the Jebei Naksh. All the tribes in this area really owed him
allegiance. But he was, nevertheless, prepared to abandon his rights over the
greater part of the area, if the Jebei Naksh remained in his possession.
8. I answered that this might perhaps have been an argument if he were
claiming the whole of Qatar. But this was not practical politics. We had, by our
treaties, guaranteed Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhs against absorption by any
other Power, and King Ibn Saud had recognised and accepted this situation by
the Treaty of Jedda. The integrity of Qatar must, therefore, be maintained, and
we really could not reasonably be expected to accept any claim which would
involve its dismemberment. Had any concession in this area been at all possible
I could assure Sheikh Y T usuf Yasin that I should have been the first person to
urge it.
9. I added that, in all the early stages of this dispute there had never been
any question of a Saudi claim to the Jebei Naksh. The claim, indeed, which had
only been put forward by Fuad Bey Hamza at an advanced stage of the
controversy, had come as a complete surprise to us. Was it worth then risking a
settlement for it?
IIT.
10. We then passed on to the second part of the frontier, i.e., that between
Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi. This brought us to
King Ibn Saud’s claim to the Khor-el-Odeid.
11. I explained that here also I had very greatly hoped that something might
have been done to meet King Ibn Saud’s wishes. But my reading of the archives
of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf had shown that the claim of Abu
Dhabi to this area was far older and stronger than I had imagined, and that the
Khor-el-Odeid had been formally recognised by us for the past sixty years at least
—long before there was any question of any Saudi claim—as the property of the
Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi.
12. I then gave Sheikh Yusuf Yasm a summary of some of the relevant
history notably the correspondence of 1878, 1881, 1890 and 1906 (see attached
note, of which Sir Reader Bullard gave the sheikh a copy later), and read him the
second paragraph of Sir Percy (then major) Cox’s letter of the 1st December,
1906, to Sheikh Zaid-bin-Khalifa of Abu Dhabi, which Sheikh Hafiz Wahba
translated, and which Muhammad Shaikho took down.
13. Sheikh YTisuf Yasin and Sheikh Hafiz Wahha attempted to argue that
King Ibn Saud’s recognition by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda of our special
treaty relations with the Trucial Sheikhs did not imply any recognition of any
particular frontiers; but I pointed out that our recognition of a valid claim by
such a sheikh to any particular place formed part of our treaty relations with
that sheikh, and must be regarded as covered by Ibn Saud’s recognition of our
special relations with him.
14. I added that as regards the Khor-el-Odeid itself King Ihn Saud would
not be losing anything of any value. The sea here, as I had seen from the air,
was a mass of reefs, while the entrance to the Khor was so long, narrow, winding
and shallow, that I could not conceive of its being any use to any one as a harbour.
But to us and to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, the continued possession of this area
had a different importance, which it could not possess for King Ibn Saud. We
did not want the Khor-el-Odeid as a harbour; but the land immediately to the
west of it afforded the only land passage between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, and it was
far more important for Abu Dhabi to retain the caravan route and to keep a
coterminous frontier with Qatar, than for King Ibn Saud, who already had good
potential harbours at such places as Ras Tanura, to obtain a new fragment of sea
coast of very problematical value. But in any case, as King Ibn Saud would be the
first to realise, we could not go back on the categorical undertaking contained in
Sir Percy Cox’s letter of 1906.
( 1 ) Not reproduced.