ملف ١١١٠\ ١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "بلاد فارس: مسائل متنوعة عن الوضع" [ظ‎‎٤‎٥] (٢٧٦/٩٥)

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Government Mandate. This seemed correct. Of the character or extent of
the powers delegated Dyer in connection with negotiations tollowing military
operations I have been told nothing. . I volunteered to go on a political
mission with Khudadad if Dyer was willing to stay at Sistan to take charge of
measures against Germans, but that we both should be absent from here in
view of critical situation as regards grain supplies I thought it highly undesir
able. About the terms of settlement I have not been consulted in any way.
I hope Government of India in these circumstances will not require me
to attend to Sarhad matters.
The political supervision of Kainat and Sistan is. a big enough charge
and the Governor is now pressing me to go to Birjand for consultation on
various matters. Directly I return from Robat I piopose to do this.
Webb-Ware used always to be in closer touch with Sarhad Sardars than
Consuls of Sistan. Cannot a special Political Officer be attached to column
who knows Baluchi if Hutchinson is nowadays devoting all his attention to
Afghan frontier ? He should continue in political charge when the force
returns to India on accession of peace or on advance to Kerman. His head
quarters may be at Dehaneh Baghi which, I think, will become an important
station for military police after the country becomes settled, as all supplies
can be locally grown at Sipeh where there are eighty Karezes.
176
Telegram P., No. 316 C., dated (and received) the 6th May 1916.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Sistan and Kain,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla (repeated to Baluchistan).
Please see Dyer’s telegram to Chief of the General Staff, No. 254, dated
April 29th.
Will 500 Sarhaddis raised at Kacba Koh be incorporated in Baluchistan
Levy Corps or Persian Military Police? I hope that neither Major Parran and
Lieutenant Wickham nor 300 rifles on way to Sistan will be diverted to this
new force as I am in urgent need of at least one officer at Dehaneh Baghi(?)
to command Sistan Levies and another officer for Sistan dep6t.
Northern Sarhaddis and Sistan Brahuis and Naruis should, in my own
opinion, be amalgamated in one Camel Corps for which we would require at
least six officers.
Sarhaddi element I regard at present as particularly unreliable. (I ?)
would like to see a considerable number of Mussalman instructors from British
Indian (regiments ?) among them. British Officers attached to this particular
Corps run, I think, greater risks than those with Hazaras or troops raised by
Sykes. Would it be possible to pay them more highly ?
177
Telegram, No. 306 F., dated (and received) the 7th May 1916.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To Ihe Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreig’n and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
On evening of May 3rd Russian troops after battle took Turkish fortified
position at Sarimeli and Kerind.
178
Telegram R., No. 1054, dated the 7th (received 8th) May 1916.
From—The Deputy Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla (repeated to Tehran and Basrah).
, T . telegram No. 149 S. has been repeated to Tehran. Please see
misers telegram of May 6th, No. 146, to Bushire. Ka warn is apparently
f)