ملف ١١١٠\ ١٩١٦ الجزء ٣ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٥‎٨] (٣٥٤/١٢١)

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Reasons for the suggested punishment.
The need for extensive, radical measures in suppressing lawlessness in
Tangistan must seem plain from the summary given above. The Persian Gov
ernment are not, and will not be for years, in a position to command the
means of restoring order there : they have no regular troops; and tribal chief
tains with shadowy power like Soulet-ud-Douleh, whose winter encampments
lie many miles across the mountain ranges, could not under the most favour
able circumstances get their tribesmen to suppress in an effective manner a
district of the plains of the coast. The coastal tribesmen in their own districts
are fully a match for the Qashqai: a few raids, and villages looted, and then
the Qashqais would be tired, and bought off by bribes: the Tangistanis would
return from the coast hills, and the position would be no better than before.
A Qashqai force too, of any size, would only be procurable between the months
of November and March. The Governor of Bushire could collect a force of the
loyal districts, which have been friendly to the British throughout the rebel
lion, and would be only too glad to see their Tangistani enemies severely
punished. But for the Governor to be able to collect such a force, and march
them into Tangistan, His Majesty’s Government would have to supply—
(i) Field guns, machine guns and ammunition.
(n) British troops to work these guns.
{iii) Mofiey to pay for the wages of the men employed and provisions
for the force.
Guns are essential, because it is impossible for Persian tribesmen armed with
rifles only to capture thick stone or mud forts, well defended by other tribes
men. Guns are the one arm that Persian tribesmen fear.
Moreover, previous experience of Persian Government expeditions makes
it certain that even with a properly equipped force, only half-measures would
result: a Persian Governor, like the Darya Begi, is incapable of doing such a
task thoroughly: the tribesmen, whom he might lead, would have no con
fidence in him. They have insisted for months past on their readiness and
desne to maich, and settle with the situation once and for all, but in co-opera
tion with any British movement.
Further prolongation of the present unsatisfactory situation will prove
most deleterious, both for the Persian and British Governments. All in this
part of Persia are well aware that the force at the command of the rebel chiefs
when unattacked as at present, does not exceed 300 Tangistanis, and some
200 Chahkutahis and Gendarmes : while it is equally well known that if
attacked by a force from Bushire, many of these men, who are now serving
under compulsion or for wages and are bound by no ties to the rebel chiefs
would desert them, and scatter. *
. To , kee P, a force of some 2,000 well-armed British troops on the defensive
in the face ot such an insignificant enemy for months together, when it would
be easy to deal with them, seems not only waste of men ; it makes the rebel
tribesmen think we are afraid of them, and has conveved the worst possible
impression of timourousness on the part of the British force throughout all
Fars, and all the shores of the Gulf. °
The rebel chiefs realise that they committed themselves from the dav
when they began attacks against us and are outlaws : they will continue to
maintain men under arms, and to treat Bushire as an enemy district as Ion 2
as they see us maintain so large a force there. In the meantime they have
ull scope for intrigue, m the hope of setting themselves right with their
own Government, inconsistent at all times : and they can play on our feelings
by using their treatment of their British captives, and their desire for release
as a bait. 9
. The continuance of the present state damages Persian interests, as it is
obviously impossible to allow passage along the caravan routes from up-
country, which traverse the hostile districts and then cross our outpost lines.
VV e cannot afford to have any of the enemy inside Bushire Island, especially
a night. and tor several reasons it would be impossible to prevent this if
tbecaravan routes were thrown open. The result means the stoppage of trade
With the interior, and severe loss to the Customs.