ملف ١١١٠\ ١٩١٦ الجزء ٣ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎١] (٣٥٤/٣٢٧)

249
Telegram R., No. 1123, dated the 18th (received 19th) May 1916.
Prom The Deputy Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Simla.
My telegram No. rood* clause 1.
I find tRat owing to an oversight at Basrah four Targistani prisoners who
have remained there were not included in total. Consequently there are
13 Tangistani prisoners and not nine as erroneously stated in abovementioned
telegram.
Addressed to Tehran ; repeated to Basrah.
250
Telegram P., No. 342 F., dated tne 18th (received 19tb) May 1916.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Minister at Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Please refer to telegram 2281 from Cox. He thinks me inconsistent
apparently, hut he has not sufficiently noted change of conditions, I think.
Operations by our troops inland has been consistently opposed by Government
of India so that I was forced to conclusion that only instrument in our hands
against Khans was Soulet-ed-Dowleh, in the absence of any intimation to the
contrary and with season advanced beyond time indicated in Bushire telegram
179—1032 (1 ?).
There seemed fair prospect of securing his assistance up to April 22nd
and even after. To re-establish his loyalty in eyes of Persian Government and
ourselves was clearly in his interests and he expressed his readiness to act.
Then came a change in his attitude. Kawam’s death gave him greater import
ance : he saw his own importance and before taking steps began to bargain
asking for £20,000 down. Persian Government and all our friends here were
convinced that he would take money and do nothing, and begged me not to
agree. In this attitude he was also confirmed by the Chagedak raid and scuttle,
as it led him to think that we had no serious intention of taking action our
selves. It came, however, to his knowledge that we knew all his connections
with rebel Khans and he has now doubt of our attitude towards him. Nor does
the raid appear to have impressed the hostile Khans themselves : all Persian
opinion here condemns it as a dangerous (expedient ?) and the question has been
put to us whether military authorities had no consideration for life of Consul.
Proper policy was strong line with Khans so long as we had a fair prospect of
backing it up by force but no longer. Not that 1 have yet abandoned it, as
with appointment of Parman Parma I can discern slight alteration for the
better in Soulet-ed-Dowleh, to obtain whose co-operation I am making further
attempt with Farman Parma’s advice and with Kawam’s support locally.
But if it fails and if His Majesty’s Government is not prepared to take
adequate action at Bushire, we must either (as it appears to me) negotiate with
Khans and make considerable concession or else resign ourselves to leaving
captives in hands of Khans in circumstances of great hardship for large part of
summer with no corresponding advantage to ourselves.
Indication that some kind of action from Bushire is under consideration
has just reached me. I trust that this is so and that it will be adequate. I
shall continue my negotiations with Soulet-ed-Dolweh (from whom I expect
to get a reply in a day or two) in the meantime.
Addressed Poreign Office; repeated Cox, Trevor.