مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎٠‎٨] (٨١٨/٢١٥)

measures had
the R.A.F. petrol store. In that case*
successfully been taken (viz. , a threat to immobilise the
Abu Dhabi pearling fleet) which were designed to aftect
the people of Abu Dh&oi ^ as well as th'-ir sheikh,
internal interference had been necessary ? and the ohei^Ji 5
having given his signature to the agreement by v/hich he had
allowed the petrol store* had simply been told that he must
give effect to it.
MR. IkNDhL suggested that it might be convenient if
he spoke before the discussion progressed any further since
from the Foreign office point of view there would be advan
tages in framing trio Question raised by the >iir luinis uiy
in even wider terms than the Air Ministry had employed.
While many of the principles enunciated in Lord Gurzon o
speech of 1£03 might still be applicable, it seemed
essential to recognise that the general situation in tne
Gulf, particularly from the international point of view,
had been completely and fundamentally revolutionised by
post-war developments. Lord Curzon’s speech had been
made at a time when the Persian Gulf had been virtually
a British lake, under unchallenged British control ana cut
off by almost impassable do sorts fr^m the North and West <,
The Ottoman Empire had proved no serious menace to this
position. Theoo was no aviation, tnere was no oil, and
there was little foreign trade. As a result, tne limits
of His Majesty’s Government’s action had been set solely
by themselves. To-day the Persian Gulf was one of the
world’s highways, bordered by strongly nationalist States,
whose interest in the Gulf was real and active, and the
discovery of oil had led other foreign Powers to take an
increasing interest in Gulf affairs. In his view, the
time had cone, or was at least rapidly approaching, when
his Majesty’s Government would no longer be able to maintain