المجموعة ٣٠/٨٣ "امتيازات نفط قطر، والسياسة الخاصة به وحمايته." [ظ‎‎٣‎٤‎٥] (١٠١٨/٧٠١)

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Extent of Commitment. ^ • n
4 We note that it is proposed to authorise the Resident m the Persian Gulf
to nromise the Sheikh, in exchange for the grant of the concession to a British
conSed combine the grant of full protection against aggressron by land. It
would appear that there is no definite line of demarcation between the territory „
of the Sheikh and that of Ibn Sand, and, consequently, no limit to the area for
irh ch responsibility for protection would be undertaken. We consider, therefore,
kat some definite boundary should be fixed before any guarantee of protection
is made.
Terms of Guarantee.
5. As the main object in undertaking this commitment appears to be to
secure the Sheikh from aggression, or any attempt at absorption, by Ibn Saud,
we suggest that any guarantee that may be given should be expressed m more
general terms than is at present proposed. Though the actual wording to be
adopted is not our immediate concern, we would suggest that the guarantee of
protection should be similar to that given in 1914 to the Sheikh of Koweit, namely,
that Qatar shall be recognised as an independent principality under British
^ If this or some similar formula is adopted, it will be clear to Ibn Saud that
any aggression against the Sheikh’s territory would be regarded by His Majesty s
Government as a hostile act.
Guarantee only Applicable to Unprovoked Aggression.
6. We attach special importance to the guarantee being made applicable
only in the event of unprovoked aggression. We consider that the Sheikh should
consent to be guided by the advice of His Majesty’s Government in his attitude
towards his neighbours, and that he should be categorically warned that the
adoption of a provocative attitude or any indulgence in raiding will result in
the forfeiture of protection.
Local Protection.
7. It is obviously impracticable to guarantee protection, either to the
Sheikh’s subjects or even to the oilfields, against the sporadic raiding which we
understand is endemic in this region. We consider, therefore, that the Sheikh
should be informed that responsibility for law and order in his territory remains
in his hands and that he will be expected to provide the necessary means for
securing the local protection of the plant and properties of the Oil Company.
Facilities for the Royal Air Force.
8. In the event of our having to implement our guarantee by the employ
ment of air forces, it would be necessary for aircraft to operate from landing
grounds in the peninsula, probably near Doha, the principal, if not the only port.
Though landing grounds exist at Bahrein and Yas Island, some ninety miles north
and south respectively of Doha, it will be necessary to establish one or more
landing grounds in Qatar in peace time, together with the necessary storage and
other facilities.
Intelligence.
9. In order to enable effective action to be taken, timely warning of any
hostile gathering or intended raid is necessary. As our existing intelligence
resources in these regions are very limited, we consider that some provision should
be made to supplement the existing sources of information and to foster relations
with the friendly tribes. We consider that the Sheikh should grant permission
for a British Intelligence or Political Officer to reside in Qatar, if necessary, and
in any event to have freedom for himself and his assistants to move about the
country.
Means of Implementing our Commitment.
10. Should it be necessary to implement our commitment, dependence will
primarily be placed on the Royal Air Force. In the event of emergency, the