مجموعة ٦ / ٨ (١) "سلسلة مطبوعة: ١٩٢٩ إلى ١٩٣٨". [ظ‎‎٤‎٤] (١٠٦٢/٩٣)

C ° , i Sultanate of Muscat and Oman,
Ali on the east where ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية “^ efs and leaders in the northern and eastern
our treaties with the ^ us c “ treaties with the various chiefs and leaders
areas corresponded exactlj to o^ ^ no difference between one part of
in the south-western district- x e t tha( . we had no t m the past
the Aden Protectorate ana an h nd eastern areas because there
^ercfsed any active control over the north were t ^
was no immediate Mason w n opened up and the influence
now that the hinterland of Nejian etc., ^ felt> it was obviously
of neighbouring Arab States w establish our own authority within our
necessary that w ®, sh “"‘ d n Sply any change of poUcy or any new departure.
own legal area. TMs M noUmplyaj^^ for whlch we were mter .
It was merely an internal x
nationally legally responsible.
7 Signor Crolla asked whether we w
gaud ovef the northern sphere. He alluded
were not negotiating with Ibn
to reports of my having carried
gaud over the northern sp ■ on ^ su bj e ct when I visited Arabia
on negotiations myseif particular secret about the fact that
last March. I replied that there was Ibn g aud for some time aboijt
discussions had been go ^ frontier _ Although this was the legal
a possible revision ° when the country was little known, and
frontier, it had been “me of the tribes who wandered to the east
there were now indications t^sonmo^^ authority> The &rea waa
one oH ttle importance and consisted almost wholly of uninhabited desert
We were therefore not inclined to insist too strongly on the legal line, and
conversations had been proceeding in a desultory way with a view to some new
Une being agreed on. They were for the time being more or less m abeyance,
and as for as we ourselves were concerned, the area which was of most im-
nortance to us was the coastal belt. But, however this might be the fact
remained that legally the whole area to the east and south -east of the blue and
violet lines fell within our sphere of influence, and was internationally under
Tr protection with the exception of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman
which was an independent State. Our actions in this area therefore could
not possibly be regarded as involving any new policy or any departure Irom
the spirit of the Rome Agreement.
8. I told Signor Crolla that I had given him this full and frank expla
nation, as I wished to clear up any risk of misunderstanding and to try to
convince him that our policy had not changed, and that we still held firmly
to the principle of the Rome Understanding that no European Power should
establish itself in independent Arabian territory. But I felt bound to add
that the Rome Understanding really seemed hardly applicable to this area,
since that Understading specifically referred to the Red Sea and to the Arabian
Red Sea coast. The areas under our protection to the south-east and east of
the violet and blue lines, which had nothing whatever to do with the Red
Sea, therefore hardly seemed to come into the picture.
9. Signor Crolla replied that the Italian Government felt that the Rome
Understanding of 1927 ought not to be applied in too narrow or local a spirit.
In their view, it was important that there should he a clear understanding
about British and Italian interests to cover the whole of Arabia and the
Middle East. I asked Signor Crolla whether he meant by this—as he had
at one moment seemed to imply—that the Italian Government wanted
the Rome Understanding extended or amplified. I was unable to get a
definite reply from him to this question, but he continued to say that it
ought to be interpreted in the widest possible spirit.
10. Signor Crolla was not- easy to follow, as he wrapped his ideas up in
complicated language with a mass of allusions and implications, from
which he showed great agility in retreating whenever I tried to hold him down
on any particular point. My first impression was that he was trying to re-
presen )a we had violated the Rome Understanding and that Italy might
therefore regard herself as free to adopt a forward policy. He did indeed
° n ®. “°“ lent hmt at something of the kind. When he reahsed, however,
how strong our case was for saying that we had serupuioulsy observed the