مجموعة ١٠/١٧(٣) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٥‎٧] (٥١٣/١١٤)

2
*r~
particularly the requirements of Greece, make it likely that the Iraqi crop wi
be disposed of at a very favourable price. The Greek Government have, however,
been requested to authorise His Majesty’s Government to negotiate on their
behalf, and I hope that it may be possible to make some political capital out ot
the matter. , , , tt- at •
8. The Iraqi Government have, indeed, asked for the help of His Majesty ^ ^
Government over Zahdi dates, but these are of such poor quality as not to U
worth shipping space. Any purchase of them would merely be for destruction
and, I think, that if payment has to be made to relieve distress among Iraqi
producers, it had better be made by the Iraqi Government.
9. I shall, of course, be grateful to receive any suggestions that your
Excellency may wish to make for using to better political advantage the money
which His Majesty’s Government are prepared to spend. I should mention in
this connexion the possibility that His Majesty’s Government may, for strategic
reasons, wish improvements of various kinds to be effected in the Iraqi railway
system. In present circumstances such improvements could hardly be made
except at the expense of His Majesty’s Government.
10. Of the requirements of His Majesty’s Government m Iraq by far the
most urgent is to secure the formation of a new Government prepared to
co-operate with them in the spirit of the alliance. I attach importance also to
rupture of relations with Italy, if only because this step would make it clear m
Iraq and elsewhere that the Iraqi Government have at last decided, despite the
intrigues of the Axis and the German declaration to the Arabs, to stand by theii
obligations towards His Majesty’s Government. I also attach great importance
to action being taken to stop'the Mufti’s intrigues. It may be difficult even for a
well-disposed Government to take really effective action against him. but even
so it should be possible to exercise some measure of control over him, and to put
an end to the present system, under which he abuses Iraqi hospitality in acting
practically openly as an enemy agent. -t at
11. Three additional points were mentioned in Sir Basil Newton s
telegram under reference.
12. Point 2 : Propaganda .—An improvement m the tone of press and
wireless broadcasts would no doubt follow the entry into power of a more
friendly Government, but I agree that His Majesty’s Government would
certainly have to see that very definite improvements did in fact take place and
were maintained. . , ^ u
13. Point 4 : Education.—I agree that the appointment ot a Britisn
adviser in the Ministry of Education would be useful, and you may well wish
to pursue this suggestion if a favourable opportunity occurs. Presumably the
post would carry no executive powers, but even so the right man might be able
to influence the Ministry’s policy in many directions, and could also co-operate
effectively with the British Council.
14. ' Point 5 : Economic Warfare .—As regards economic warfare, impor
tance is attached to closer Iraqi collaboration in checking re-exports to doubtful
destinations, and the smuggling of goods to Syria so long as the policy or
economic pressure on Syria is maintained; also in controlling goods in transit,
whether destined for, or originating in, countries to which their equivalent to
Trading with the Enemy Act has been made to apply. In this connexion I would
invite your attention to my telegram No. 96, A rfar, of,,the__22lldM)ecember last
regarding German exports to Iran. I realise that the prohibition of this trade
may cause difficulties between the Governments of Iraq and Iran, but it is a step
which His Majesty’s Government are clearly entitled under article 4 of the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance to require that the Iraqi Government shall take,
and is one to which they attach importance
I am, &c.
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
11 § i MR 94 j