ملف ١٧٤٩\ ١٩٢١ "الخليج الفارسي:- ملخصات إخبارية للمقيمية البريطانية ١٩٢١-١٩٢٥" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٨] (٤٩٤/٢٧١)

As regards Sardar Sepali, the situation was rather delicate.. His Excellency is
more or less surrounded by people who din into his ears all kinds of extravagant stories
about the wickedness and perversity of British policy in Persia. I had taken a good
deal of trouble, when occasion offered, to endeavour to weed these suspicions out of his
mind, but at that moment he had got a fresh obsession about the alleged southern
federation which, from my experience of his character, I felt sure it would require a
certain amount of time to eradicate. Any too emphatic intervention against the
despatch of a force to Arabistan might well have defeated its own object, and have
confirmed the suspicions which haunted the mind of the Minister for War. The matter
was a delicate one to approach for several other reasons. In the first place we had no
very definable locus standi in the matter j it was clear that no justification existed for
our objecting to the despatch of Persian troops to any point withm Persian territory,
\Y0 "were, however, under an obligation not to peimit enctoachment on the sheikhs
territory ; at the same time it was by no means certain that any occupation of the
sheikh’s territory was contemplated, and unless a case of necessity arose, it seemed
undesirable to take our stand on our obligations to tne sheikh m dealing with the
Persian Government, which, so far as I am aware, is officially ignorant alike of their
existence and their nature. Secondly, any frank discussion of the matter with the
Persian Government was bound to involve a reference to our obligations to the Sheikh.
Thirdly, I was pretty certain—and subsequent events have.amply justified my belief—
that whatever I said would be misinterpreted and bandied about in the press in an
utterly distorted form. Fourthly, I had not perceived up till then—nor have I since—
any inclination on the part of the Persian Government to accept friendly advice,
however, sincerely meant and considerately tendered. Fifthly, I was conscious of the
prickly hyper-sensitiveness of the Persian Government to any foreign observation on a
matter touching the exercise of what it believes to be its indefeasible sovereign rights.
On the other hand, I was not averse from the idea of the sheikh having some
moments of anxiety which I hoped would render him more inclined to settle up the
question of his revenue, both past and future, and so remove a source of friction between
himself and the Persian Government, deprive the latter of any plausible reason for
threatening him by a local display of force, and diminish the risk of our being called
upon to discharge our obligation to protect him against encroachment on his rights and
territories. From another point of view it seemed to me highly desirable that the
Sheikh should square his accounts and get a clean bill from the Persian Government
before the arrival of the American advisers, and so obviate the necessity of any
discussion with them of the special position created for the sheikh by our agreements
with him.
Thus I felt that this weapon to bring pressure to bear on the sheikh to settle his
revenue account might be turned to advantage, and that a strong representation to the
Persian Government, even if it were opportune from other points of view, which I
doubted, might encourage him to prolong a further resistance to a settlement.
All things considered, I decided to send Mr. Havard to. see Sardar Sepah, and I
instructed him to ascertain, if possible, what his Excellency’s intentions were as regaras
the despatch of a force to Arabistan and to use any opportunity which occurred in the
course of conversation to point out the desirability of such a step, which was calculated
to jeopardise the peace of a district, then fortunately tranquil, in which British and
Persian interests of real magnitude were involved, whereas there were many other
regions in Persia where a restraining force could be employed far more usefully and
much less dangerously. My own impression was, moreover, in view of the difficulty
which Sardar Sepah was experiencing in the concentration of sufficient troops m
Azerbaijan to crush the Simko rebellion, that his Excellency, for the time being at all
events, would be hard put to find enough men to send to Arabistan.
Mr. Havard acquitted himself ably of his mission and spoke in the desired sense to
Sardar Sepah on the 19th April. The latter said it was his intention to send troops to
all parts of Persia, but that none were likely to start for Arabistan for another three
or four months ; it was apparent that the sheikh’s failure to pay his revenue was
uppermost in his mind. Meanwhile, T telegraphed to His Majesty’s consul-general at
Bushire requesting him to urge the sheikh as strongly as he could to settle the revenue
question, for in that case I should be in a much stronger position for opposing the
despatch of troops in more than a very general manner.
By my telegram JSo. 199 of the 25th April, I had the hofiour of acquainting V 01 ; 11
Lordship briefly with the situation and with mv own views in regard thereto, and iu
your reply, telegram No. 147 of the 31st May, you directed me to refrain fbuj 1
divulging in any conversation with Sardar Separ the nature of the assurances wnic