‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدليستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٤‎١] (٣٨٦/٨٦)

Paslia, a rebellious Muntafik Chief of Turkish Arabia with whom Sheikh Muba
rak was in friendly relations, made a sudden and successful raid upon the terri
tories and subjects of Ibn Hash id. In October IDUO Ibn Rashid descended
from his desert fastnesses to the neighbourhood of Samawah with the purpose
of attacking Sadun, to whose assistance the Sheikh of Koweit immediately pro
ceeded, and a collision appeared to be imminent upon the borders of Turkish
territory. The Turkish Wali of Basrah, however, who was well disposed to
Mubarak, intervened between the combatants ; Ibn Rashid was persuaded to
return to Central Arabia in consideration of a promise that Sadun would be
punished by the Turks, and Mubarak was induced to pay a visit to the Wali
at a place near Zobeir in Turkish territory, where a Turkish decoration was
conferred upon him.
The results of this pacification were transient. In December 1900 the
Sheikh of Koweit, notwithstanding that he had been warned by the Govern
ment of India to avoid activity giving the Turks a pretext for interference,
undertook, in concert with Sadun Pasha, a serious invasion of Central Arabia
in the interests of Ibn Sand. He soon reached Hafar and, after a temporary
retirement, advanced into Kasim where bis successes were rapid and brilliant.
In March 1901, however, he met with a decided reverse, in which his army was
dispersed, and was obliged to return to Koweit.
The Turks immediately took advantage of Mubarak’s weakened position to
press their designs on Koweit. In May 1901 the Wali of Basrah visited
Koweit and tried to intimidate the Sheikh into accepting a Turkish garrison at
his capital; hut the Sheikh would not agree, and shortly afterwards he applied
to the British Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf to be taken under a
regular British protectorate. The position was immediately placed by Lord
Curzon before 11 is Majesty’s Government together with a statement of the
alternative policies between which a choice lay. The motives which prompted
the Sheikh’s request were selfish; he was afraid of Ion Rashid and of the
Turks, and he merely turned to the British Government as the least exacting
of his neighbours. It was open to His Majesty’s Government to declare
an open protectorate over Koweit, and this in Lord Curzon’s opinion was
the inevitable ultimate solution of the question; on the other hand, it was
also possible to maintain the patchwork status quo^ but this was a make
shift which would not stop intrigue, and it would cover a policy which
in the last resort was indistinguishable from a protectorate. His Majesty’s
Government were unwilling to incur the difficulties and embarrassments
which might result from the deelaration of a protectorate ; but they authorised
the Government of India to inform Mubarak that, while his request for a
protectorate could not be granted, the British Government would observe their
agreement with him provided that he on his part adhered to his engagements
with Government. A suggestion by Lord Curzon that the Sheikh should
he advised to discontinue the use of the Turkish flag, replacing it by the red
flag of an independent Arab Chief, did not commend itself to His Majesty’s
Government. The assurance authorised by the Secretary of State reached
Mubarak on the 23rd of August 19ol, and two days later an attempt was
made by the commander of the Turkish war vessel “ Zuhaf ”, then at Koweit,
to extort from the Sheikh an admission of Turkish sovereignty. Diplo
matic discussions at Constantinople ensued, in which the German Embassy
participated on the Turkish side, and at the beginning of September a settle
ment was arranged on the basis of a mutual maintenance of the existing
(but imperfectly defined) position : the Turks were at the same time informed
that interference by them with Koweit would not be tolerated. This arrange
ment however did not alleviate the strained situation which prevailed at the
place itself. In September 1901 raids were made by Ibn Rasbid into Koweit
territory and a large number of Mubarak’s Bedouin subjects flocked in from
the desert and took refuge from attack under the walls of the town. Lord
Curzon authorised the British naval authorities to repel any assault by Ibn
Rashid upon Koweit town, but he directed that the Atnir should be first
warned, tif possible, that British troops would assist in the defence of the place.
British gunboats were accordingly placed in readiness to meet the expected
attack and general measures of defense were arranged which restored confidence