‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدليستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎٣‎٦] (٣٨٦/٢٧٦)

13
oppose a bnrrier to Russian advance from the north or north-east. There is
yet another contingency in which Khor Musa might play a part in the
political developments of the future. Though it does not seem likely at
present that these will include the construction of a British railway in the
south-west corner of the Persian dominions, it is worth while to know that a
possible maritime outlet for such a project exists, which may be worthy of more
detailed consideration in circumstances that cannot at present be foreseen. For
all these reasons we commend to the attention of His Majesty’s Government the
features of a place that seems to us to possess strategic and possibly com««
mercial capabilities of no mean order.
8
No. 25 (Secret—External), dated Fort William, the 4th February 190A.
F rom -_The Government of India, Foreign Department,
To— The Right Hon'ble St. John Biiodrick, His Majesty’s Secretary of State
for India.
In bis Secret despatch No. ''9G, dated the 17th December, His Excellency
the Viceroy briefly mentioned his recent visit to Koweit and the Khor Abdulla,
and the prospects of the shores of this waterway as a future possible railway
terminus. We now have the honour to address you in greater detail on the
subject.
2. It will be within the recollection of Ills Majesty’s Government that
early in 1902 it was reported that the Turks hid established a post at the head of
the Khor Abdulla. The Commander of H M S. “ Sphinx ”, who was sent to
enquire into the matter, visited the locality between the 14th and the 19th of
February, and reporte 1 that, in addition to a position which they had occupied
at Um Kasr, the Turks had, for the first time about a fortnight previously,
stationed a force of some 20 men on the south*east corner of Bubiyan Island.
This unwarranted encroachment vas at once brought to the notice of your
predecessor, reference was made to the importance of the positions seized, and it
was proposed by the Viceroy that the Turks should be told that they must at
once leave Bubivan, even if no protest were offered against the occupation of
Um Kasr. On the 26th March, Lord George Hamilton telegraphed that
it was considered inadvisable to raise irritating discussions about the move
ments of Turkish troops to places to which the Sheikh’s title would be difficult
to prove, and it was explained that His Majesty’s Government did not wish to
obstruct the prolongation of the Baghdad Railway to the Gulf, whether at
Koweit or elsewhere. It was added, however, that their assistance would
be conditional upon British capital receiving, in respect of construction,
materials, and management, at least equal shares with any other Power. In the
event, no action was taken to assert the Chief’s claims beyond an intimation
to the Porte that their action was regarded as constituting a disturbance ol the
status quo, and that the occupation of the places m question could not bo
regarded as in any way prejudicing the SheikKs rights and authority over
them, and the Turkish posts still remain at Um Kasr and A1 Geit, where they
were then established.
3. The importance of the question lies in its relation to the future
probable terminus of what is known as the Baghdad Railway. . Article I of the
Convention, dated the 21st January 1902, between the Turkish Government
and the promoters of this enterprise provides that the projected railway shall
run from 2 dbeir to a point on the Persian Gulf to be determined by mutual
agreement between the Ottoman Porte and the Company, and there appears to
be no doubt that the Turkish advance of 1902 to the shores of Khor Abdulla
and the island of Bubiyan was designed to enable the concessionaires to secure,
without reference to His Majesty’s Government, what was already recognised
by the German Engineers, and has since been generally ac mov ec ^e o ic,
the most suitable terminus on the Gulf. The first section of the line is now,
we understand, in course of construction by German enterprise unaided, and