ملف ٣٤٤٣/١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "الحرب الألمانية: المبعوثون الألمان إلى أفغانستان" [و‎‎٦‎٠] (٤٩٠/١٢٨)

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Telegram R., dated (and received) the 4th September 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Following from Shiraz, 303. Tour telegram No. 131. Be. Soulet
and Kawam, my idea would be to try to enter into some more or less formal
agreement with them for mutual friendship and support.
Any subsidy or arms promised by us would naturally be supplied
gradually as seemed justified by course of events aud their attitude.
Will try to bring about something similar to conditions (prevailing?) in
Arabistan. I am now sounding them both on the subject and will submit
more definite proposals later if I find their attitude Satisfactory.
162
Telegram P , No. 316 F., dated the 4th (received 5th) September 1915.
From— His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Urgent. The conversation which the Russian Minister had with His
Majesty the Shah of Persia yesterday was not satisfactory. Shah seems to be
somewhat under influence of enemy. Prussian Minister and 1 are of opinion
after a long and careful consideration that an attempt at Ispahan following on
other attrcks on our Consul(s) discloses a state of affairs that demands strong
action without delay on the part of British and Itussian Governments.
It is plain that object of enemy is to bring about a rupture of relations
between Persian Government and the two Powers by infamies of this kind so
as to enable enemies to announce union of two Islamic peoples. No action
whatever is taken by Persian Government .to restrain German proceedings or
even to influence public opinion against them ; Government’s one idea on the
contrary is to use Germans as a means to squeeze us unless we can bring some
kind of pressure to bear on them and offer them substantial inducements also.
If we applied pressure in the nature of say occupation of another port, such
action would defeat its own object, because it will only (provide ?) Germans
with another pretext to inflame public feeling against us as in the case of
Bushire. Unless numbers of Russian troops at Kasvin are very greatly
augmemed say up to 15,000 men same considerations would also apply to
their being used, and even if Russian troops were available there is no time
for this.
Only course which is left to us (is to ?) offer Persian Government the
choice of declaring herself on our side or on the side of enemy. It would be
insufficient to ask (?) Persia to break off relations with the enemy Powers;
distinction is of too subtle a nature for the average Persian intellect to grasp
and step would be so signal a one as to leave no room for doubt or half
measures. If Persian Government wants to join us, she must make a
declaration of war on enemy Powers and we would in that case agree to
moratorium from now to be in force until say three years after the conclu
sion of the war. In contrary case the British and Russian Legations would
leave the country at once holding Persian Ministers responsible for safety of
our Consuls and colonies on their journey, for safety of any of our nationals
who wished to stay back and for safety of all British and Russian property in
Persia.
Persian Government would be allowed say 48 hours in which to arrive at
a decision.
My Russian colleague and I believe there is a chance that Persian Gov
ernment would accept these terms though that Government would very likely
stipulate for military assistance, for a sum of money to be paid down, for a