'File 8/15 Arab Series - 1933-1939' [‎168v] (336/434)

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m Jedda. The object of the journey was purely scientific, and he had, in
fact, collected a great mass of information which he hoped would be of use to
science, and had established the position of over a hundred points. Through
out the expedition the only connexion he had had with Ibn Saud was that,
as a matter of courtesy, whenever he was within reach of a Saudi telegraph
station he sent a telegram to the King reporting the date of arrival and the
probable date of departure.
2. To show that the journey had originally no concern with politics, he
could state that he had written all he had intended to say about the Hadhra-
maut before he started back from Shibam, i.e., before the breakdown of one
of his cars compelled him to go to Mukalla to try to get a new back-axle.
The chapter was colourless, in spite of the fact that he had “ seen a lot of
things ” about which he might have written. But after the reception he
received when he applied to the Resident at Aden for assistance he had changed
his mind. Having been attacked, he proposed to defend himself, and he
would add chapters to his forthcoming book which would tell the world the
facts about the Aden Protectorate. He was prepared to give His Majesty’s
Minister all these facts, but he also proposed to give them to the Saudi Gov
ernment.
3. The criticism directed against his visit to Shabwa was entirely un
justified. His journey was on all fours with that of Bertram Thomas across
the Rub-al-Khali. He was quite right in claiming that, apart from the
Hadhramaut, his journey lay in unexplored, undemarcated territory. To
claim Shabwa and those parts for the Aden Protectorate was fantastic, for no
protection was afforded. Nor could the Aden authorities claim the virtue of
leaving the people thereabouts to manage their own affairs, for they bombed
them. The Aden attitude towards Shabwa was exactly like that of the
Italians towards WaJwal at the beginning of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute,
and British policy was no more honest than that of Italy had been. The
British were trying to expand at the expense of the Arabs.
4. His policy remained what it had always been, viz., to try to obtain for
the Arabs what they were promised early in the Great War. He had chal
lenged His Majesty’s Government to publish the promises made then (the
McMahon correspondence), but with their habitual cowardice they had re
fused. There were plenty of copies in Arabic to be had, but the English
correspondence ought to be published. He would tell His Majesty’s Minister
a “ secret he used to possess copies of the correspondence in English,
given to him by T. E. Lawrence, but they were stolen from him by a clerk
of his in Jedda.
5. He was interested to hear (for the first time) that the King of the
Yemen had protested to Ibn Sand, alleging that the expedition had entered
Yemen territory at Jauf and Marib. He wondered how the King had heard
about it. In point of fact, he had not gone to Marib, but had taken photo
graphs and bearings from a height from which it was visible. (Mr. Philby
evaded, or at least did not answer, the question whether the height in question
was in Yemen territory.)
6 . No, it was not quite correct to say that he was asking for more for
Ibn Saud than Ibn Saud was asking for himself, though it was near the truth.
What he wanted was the establishment of the promised Arab independence
in the Arab Peninsula and the elimination of any foreign rule which conflicted
with the promises.
Mr. Philby claimed to know all about the British and Saudi proposals for
the southern frontier of Saudi Arabia and to have the two lines marked on
maps in his possession. When His Majesty’s Minister said that in that case
he must have known that Shabwa lay well to the south of the proposed Saudi
line, he said that the position of Shabwa on the map was a long way out,
but he did not deny that Shabwa was even farther to the south than the map
shows, and therefore at a greater distance from the extreme limits claimed by
Ibn Saud than appeared from the map.