'File 8/15 Arab Series - 1933-1939' [‎173v] (346/434)

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the war, recalled the loyalty with which he had offered to help the Sherif
Hussein against the Turks, and spoke of the “ guarantees ” which he had
received from Sir Percy Cox. Nothing whatever had come of these
“ guarantees,” though he had been promised “ all sorts of things. ” He
had assisted the Arab policy of His Majesty’s Government by communicating
to them the written and oral offers which he received from the Turks as an
inducement to him to join them against Hussein—offers which he refused,
alleging that he could not move against the British because they were his
neighbours on the Gulf, and saying that, in any case, he could not join the
Turks when they were slaughtering Arabs. At first he even told His Majesty’s
Government that he would accept Hussein as King of the Arabs, but later
he was obliged to withdraw this offer. He told Hussein that the resources
in money and arms which were supplied by the British were being wasted
through being dealt out to the various sheikhs according to the number
of followers they said they had, and asked that, if be sent his son and some men
to help, they should only be given arms for themselves and food to eat, and
Hussein had replied that Ibn Saud must be either mad or drunk. Ibn Saud
thereupon informed the British Government that he must lay down two con
ditions : that he would not recognise Hussein as King of the Arabs, though
he did not object to his being King of the Hejaz, and that when the war was
over His Majesty’s Government should allow him to settle his own scores with
Hussein. He had always listened to the advice of His Majesty’s Government,
even to his own hurt. On more than one occasion he had fallen out with
his chief supporters, the Ikhwan, for that reason, e.g., when he retook Turaba
which the Sherifians had unjustly occupied, and His Majesty’s Government
asked him not to go any further ; when he refrained at the request cf His
Majesty’s Government from taking Aqaba, where the ex-King Hussein was
staying, and Maan ; and when he listened to the mediation of the British agent
at Jedda and ensured the peaceful occupation of the city to the disappoint
ment of some of his followers. For all this loyal support, and after all the
promises made to him, what had he got ? Nothing whatever. On the
contrary !
10. He would put his complaints under three heads
{a) His Majesty’s Government had not given him the help he needed.
(b) Their boundary policy was always squeezing him in.
(c) By their Gulf policy they tried to make him dependent commercially
on Koweit and Bahrein.
Whereas a friend in need of help looked to a more powerful friend to assist him,
he had had no help from His Majesty’s Government. Look what His Majesty^
Government had done for Egypt and Iraq ! Those countries might be richer
than Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia could, in his opinion, be more useful
than either to His Majesty’s Government.
11. After expressing great interest in the valuable historical survey
which the King had given, but pointing out that what we had to adopt as a
basis was the facts of to-day, Mr. Rend el suggested that one difficulty was that,
whereas countries like Egypt and Iraq, which contained rich natural resources,
could be developed by commercial enterprises which would earn their own
profits, Saudi Arabia did not at present appear to be economically in that
category. If, however, Ibn Saud had any particular kind of help in mind
and would specify what it was, he could be sure that the suggestion would be
considered very carefully. Ibn Saud said that there were all sorts of help that
he might mention, but he would speak first of aviation, to which he attached
great importance. He had sent to His Majesty’s Minister through “ that
man ” (pointing to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin) a suggestion about the training of
Saudis in aviation in Great Britain. As to the Italians, he swore as a Moslem
and an Arab that when the Italian aeroplanes arrived, he wished that Allah
would destroy the machines and the men in them. Mr. Rendel reminded the
King that the failure of other countries to follow our example in reducing
armaments had compelled us to rearm, and that the expansion of the British
air force was employing to the full all our resources for the manufacture of
aeroplanes and the training of men as pilots and mechanics, and that, while