'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎104v] (213/454)

186 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
wrote in a private letter to Lord Hardinge: " It seems to me,
however, that sooner or later we must advance to Nasiriya
and Amara." On the 23rd, the Secretary of State telegraphed
officially that the Mesopotamian situation was causing him
anxiety, and he suggested that another infantry brigade, a
cavalry regiment, and a Territorial field battery should be sent
from India. In view of the great issues in Europe, the War Office
were unable to assist. This was followed by a private telegram
on the 26th, in which Lord Crewe expressed the wish that we
could strike at the Turkish force on the Euphrates before
more troops could be massed there, and he asked for General
Barrett’s views and for Lord Hardinge’s opinion on them.
In a private telegram of the 28th replying to this, Lord
Hardinge summarised the situation at Qurna and on the
lower Euphrates as it had altered since his visit to Mesopo
tamia. He concluded: “ The forces at Barrett’s disposal
seem to me strong enough to cope with any forces at present
opposed to him, but in view of constant rumours of troops
being on the march to Baghdad from Syria and elsewhere,
I would like to see his command made up to two divisions
An advance to Nasiriya and Amara seems to me absolutely
necessary if quiet is to prevail at Basra, but Barrett told me
that his great difficulty is shortness of river transport.”
On the 2nd March, the Government of India sent an official
reply to Lord Crewe’s telegram of the 23rd. After summarising
the situation in Mesopotamia, the Indian authorities came to
the conclusion that the enemy on the Euphrates would probably
advance on a wide front with their right in the desert outflanking
Barrett, who had only 14,400 men and 40 guns at Basra,
including the detachment at Ahwaz. Turning to available
resources in India, they could only send—in addition to the
cavalry regiment and the heavy battery then on their way—
two battalions of Indian infantry (being replaced from China),
a Territorial battery, and possibly an Imperial Service Indian
infantry battalion. They emphasised their heavy responsibi
lities to the Indian and European population of India. The
internal situation was again getting worse, and they had to
make provision for the trouble which seemed probable on the
North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. in the spring. Most of the frontier
tribes were showing signs of unrest and many agents were
preaching Jahad among them; and from several different
sources German officers had been reported as on their way
to Afghanistan. In addition, the attitude of some of the
Mahomedan troops seemed uncertain, as they were averse to