Coll 17/10(3) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎20r] (39/513)

[Cypher]
* A1ENDED COPY *
DISTRIBUT ION B .
FROM: IRAQ.
I /
19
FROM BAG-DAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
Sir K. Cornwallis
No. 267
3rd April, 1941.
Dc W/T
Ro 12.20 a.m.
4th April, 1941.
4th April, 1941.
Repeated to Cairo telegram No. 108.
Tehran telegram No, 51.
Angora telegram No. 90.
Governor of India telegram No. 57.
Jedda telegram No. 32.
eeeeeeeeeee
IMMEDIATE.
I have found the Regent at Habbaniya on my arrival yesterday
afternoon and had short talk with him before coming here. As
it was probably my only opportunity of seeing him for some time,
I was obliged to give him advice before I had studied the local
situation but developments of last few hours and my conversations
since my arrival have not * caused me to modify * views which
I expressed.
mu ^ thought the hour of compromise had passed.
The Army Chiefs and Rashid Ali were evidently determined to seize
power and either turn him our or make him a puppet. So far as
my information went the majority of the population and a
considerable part of the army were favouraule to him but this
feeling was likely to wane if he did not take immediate steps to
rally them. I therefore.supported his intention of proceeding
to Basra and encouraged him to take stroug and energetic action
to restore the situation. I approved his intention to form new
Cabinet with Ali Jaudat or Jamii Madfai as Prime Minister, to
summon the Chamber and Senate to Basra in order to obtain their
public support of his cause, to issue an appeal to the nation and
to promise an amnesty to any officers and men of the army who had
been obliged to act disloyally, on condition that they renounce
the army leaders whose dismissal he proposed publicly to
announce. With these and other measures which would be
necessary as the situation developed he thought that there was
a good chance of obtaining such a strong display of popular
synpathy that revolutionaries would collapse through lack of s^rvpo'rt
3. I share his opinion that the situation can be saved but
only if he takes immediate and strong action. Unfortunately
owing to weather conditions he could not leave for Basra until this
afternoon. Ali Jaudat went with him. Whether he and his
supporters will really act with energy and decision remains to be
seen. They seem to nave been singularly negligent in making
plans to meet a situation which has been staring them in the
faces for weeks. _ His adherents here have gone to ground so I
can do little to influence the situation but I propose to fly to
Basra in a few days if a new Cabinet is formed in order to go
through the ritual of presentation [grp. undec.] credentials.
5. [SicJ In the meantime Bagdad is quiet and my advisers
do not anticipate disorders at present.