Coll 17/10(3) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎82r] (163/513)

I if INDE ^ ^ Compliment*
^ of the
tlfltder Secretary of StAt®
f#F Forei^ft Affaif**
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IJwiA DIRECT
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From: IRAQ
i<e ' rt ° n iBaB ' i,d 6 th
D. "l0ol7» o»m. 6th February, 1941.
R. 5.20- u.m= 7th February, 1941.
No. 115 .
IMPORTANT
B b b b b B
In the following survey I have tried to set out developments
leading to the overthrow of Rashid Ali in their due^propor ion
and perspective and to give estimate of political prospects.
Time of greatest danger in Iraq was probably in the summer
following the collapse of France with its grave consequences for
our position in the'Middle Fast. Riskwas mpt excessive
then and could at any time have been met haa it been possible
to spare British troops even if only for passage m transi .
Iraq desired both to re-insure against Axis success and to
exploit our weakness while there was yet time and our explici
refusal at the end of August to make concessions in Pales in
or promises in regard to Syria no doubt strongly influenced ?
Rashid Ali in his decision to define^uhe policy of the axis.
LscSAfous and reckleas in his efforts to renain an oo.er
unscrupulous and recKiess m ms
rJsrflft ^Since^the death of
t^lin!?hIrr?nlALfion was afso U r^ifi^: *‘'Since°the death of
1 King Faisal in 1955 crises military intervention and coup
d'etat have been the normal accompaniment of all changes ol
Government with the exception of change of last nui
Administration* Previous record of Rashid is pamcuiaiiy
bfd and his recent efforts to.cling to power were made more ^
than usually desecrate by [? intensely] strong I ores sure j.
T^ decSo^ to ?orce thl pace with him was no Joubt well
iusthfied hut in the above circumstances it is not a marrer
surprise or undue pessimism that the struggle has been long
and^ devere 0 0
The struggle may not be oyer and the danger of military^
coup though less.menacing is still presen . which were to P
Vippn fippnirvnl t shed cinQ worst difiicii-L di
someex?ent C thlafterm“h of the above-mentioned events in the
summer, have probably been overcome. P^gr^ss towamls sou ^
political conditions will no aoubu continue to be 17.
times uncertain and will probably necessitate thc^contin^^d^^^
exercise of strong, though I hope now nor + rnl] -Ki g’-ph .he is
Rashid Ali will of course still try to make trouble Du^n^^
much less dangerous than when in office ana h P .
l
and/